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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study issues in Corporate Finance and Industrial Or-
ganization related to the behavior of markets with asymmetric information. The first two chapters
study the economics of credit rating agencies; the third chapter examines a process of social learn-
ing about product quality. Chapter 1 models the effect of rating agency competition on the quality
of rated securities. I compare equilibria across a regime of competition between two rating agencies
and a monopolistic regime. In both regimes, all available agencies are hired in equilibrium, so under
competition more ratings are observed. However, competing agencies do not fully internalize the
return of a reputation for being honest. Whenever strategic agencies are not very concerned about
their reputation, competition can induce more issuer effort than monopoly. Otherwise, a monopolis-
tic agency induces more effort. Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of the Cuomo Plan, a much-discussed
regulation that prohibits issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities from making payments to
rating agencies contingent on the assigned ratings. I construct a certification model which consists
of the following features: (i) an issuer privately informed about her securitys quality can hire a rat-
ing agency to assign a rating; (ii) the agency can observe, at a cost, a private signal correlated with
the quality of the security; (iii) an undeserved favorable rating reduces the agencys future revenues.
vi
I show that the Plan has an effect on the informative content of the rating only if the agency’s signal
is not too costly. In this case, the Plan ensures that the rating is more informative; otherwise the
Plan has no effect. In chapter 3, I study the pricing strategy of a monopolistic firm in a market char-
acterized by consumers with heterogeneous preferences and private information about the product
quality. Consumers purchase sequentially and observe the history of purchasing decisions, prices,
and consumers’ preferences. I characterize the conditions under which the monopolist gains when
consumers learn the true quality, and, which pricing strategy ensures that learning takes place.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Certifier Competition and Product Quality
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis put credit rating agencies in the public spotlight.1 Favorable and unde-
served ratings were blamed for encouraging issuers of structured products to sell extremely low
quality securities. Unlike issuers of other financial assets such as corporate bonds, issuers of struc-
tured products could design their securities to meet the requirements of the rating procedures.2 A
recent report by the U.K. Financial Services Authority highlights this issue:
While a corporate bond issuer can make only limited adjustments to its balance sheet
to improve its rating ... an originator of a structured credit product has an incentive and
flexibility to design them in such a way as to obtain maximal ratings.3
In these markets, however, undeserved ratings not only left investors uninformed, but also encour-
aged issuers to originate and securitize high-risk loans.
The lack of competition in the credit rating market was blamed for the low quality of the rating
process. Regulators in the United States and the European Union have argued that increased com-
petition among rating agencies is desirable. A recent SEC report illustrates the position of the U.S.
1Ashcraft et al. (2011) and Benmelech and Duglosz (2009b) provide detailed accounts of the role of credit rating
agencies in the recent financial crisis.
2See the Coburn Levin Senate Report, part V, section B, and Benmelech and Duglosz (2009a) for a description of
the rating process of a structured finance product.
3Fennell and Medvedev (2011).
2Congress:
In enacting the Rating Agency Act, Congress found that “the 2 largest credit rating
agencies [Moody’s and S&P] serve the vast majority of the market, and additional
competition is in the public interest.”4
Will an increase in the number of available rating agencies lead to more informative ratings? Will
informative ratings induce socially efficient choices of investment in product quality? To answer
these questions, I construct a two-period certification model that captures the relationship between
credit ratings and the quality of rated products under different structures of the credit rating market.
In every period, an issuer can exert effort to increase the quality of her security. Quality can be
any characteristic of the security that affects its value, such as expected return or riskiness. Neither
the issuer’s effort nor the security’s quality can be observed by the buyers. However, the issuer
can hire rating agencies to observe a signal correlated with the security’s quality and then assign
a rating. Rating agencies are long-lived agents. They can be strategic or committed to honesty.
Strategic agencies face a classic trade-off: inflate their ratings and increase current revenues, or rate
honestly and preserve a reputation for honesty. In this context, I compare equilibria across a regime
of competition between two rating agencies and a monopolistic regime.
If two agencies are available in the market, I show that the issuer hires both agencies. This result
matches the empirical evidence for structured finance ratings. Benmelech and Duglosz (2009b)
show that over the period from 2004 to 2007 most structured finance tranches were receiving more
than one rating. Rating agencies are not textbook competitors selling substitute goods. Rather, they
are experts with competing opinions.
4SEC (2012).
3When reputation incentives are weak, that is, when rating agencies heavily discount future rev-
enues, I show that competing agencies can provide more informative ratings than a monopolistic
agency. As a result, in the competition regime the issuer has a stronger incentive to invest in the
quality of her security. When reputation provides a strong discipline, a monopolistic agency induces
more investment in quality.5
Even when reputation motives are weak and strategic agencies are likely to assign undeserved
ratings, under the competition regime buyers have the opportunity to compare independent ratings.
The presence of a low rating, for example, makes a high rating look suspicious. This opportunity
to compare ratings ensures that buyers are better informed and has an indirect effect on the issuer’s
incentive to invest in quality. At the same time, a monopolistic agency has stronger incentives
to maintain a reputation for honesty in order to induce the issuer to invest in quality. When buyers
expect more effort from the issuer, they are willing to pay a higher price for a security with favorable
ratings. As long as the rating fee is proportional to the expected quality of the security, a higher
security price allows the agency to request a higher fee from the issuer. If multiple agencies rate
the same security, each and every agency’s reputation determines the issuer’s decision of effort.
Competing agencies do not fully internalize the effect of their reputation. Ultimately, this externality
reduces the competitors’ incentives to maintain a reputation for honesty.
My results imply that competition might increase the incentive to invest in the quality of a
security in markets where rating agencies are only weakly disciplined by reputation motives. One
5Monopoly and competition might also differ in the total amount of information that all agencies obtain. I abstract
from this issue and assume that in the two regimes the total amount of information observed by the rating agencies is
constant.
4such example are markets where a large number of new securities are issued in a short amount
of time, as in the case of asset-backed securities in the years preceding the financial crisis. In
these markets, many ratings are assigned before the investors acquire the information necessary to
evaluate the ratings’ quality. At the same time, competition among rating agencies is not desirable
in every rating market. In markets where the volume of ratings is constant over time, competition
might be detrimental to the quality of the ratings and the investments in securities’ quality.
In an extension of my model, I characterize the equilibria in the case of competition between
rating agencies observing identical signals of quality. When the signals are closely correlated with
the quality of the security, conditionally independent signals result in stronger incentives to invest
in quality than identical signals.
This paper presents the first model to simultaneously consider rating agencies’ reputational in-
centives and issuers’ investments in the quality of their securities. These issues have, so far, been
considered separately. The certification models for products of endogenous quality developed by
Albano and Lizzeri (2001) and Donaldson and Piacentino (2012) abstract from the reputational in-
centives of certifiers. Both papers conclude that a monopolistic regime in the market for certification
induces inefficient amounts of investment in product quality. Under a monopolistic regime, firms
under-invest in product quality, anticipating that any potential increase in revenues would be cap-
tured by the rating fees. A regime of competition would ensure lower certification fees and could
mitigate this sort of hold-up problem. In my model, investment in a security’s quality takes place
only after the agencies set their fees. As a result, this inefficiency is not present.
5A growing body of literature in quality certification considers competition among strategic cer-
tifiers. The focus is on certifiers concerned with their reputation for rating honestly. Unlike my
model, this literature considers the certification of products of exogenous quality. In Bouvard and
Levy (2012), firms can hire more than one rating agency to rate their security. The authors are
concerned with the possibility of rating agencies developing different reputations among firms and
buyers. They find, in line with my results, that reputation provides a weaker discipline for raters
under competition than under monopoly. Strausz (2005), Lo (2010), and Camanho and Deb (2012)
limit the firms to hiring, at most, one rating agency. All these models predict that monopoly always
ensures more informative ratings than competition among certifiers.
In the model developed in this paper, reputational incentives are always desirable. A strategic
agency that worries about its reputation will honestly report the signal privately observed. Reputa-
tional incentives are not always socially desirable. In Mariano (2011), rating agencies improve their
reputation for expertise by disregarding private information and assigning ratings based on public
information; competition among agencies exacerbates the inefficiency and results in informational
losses.
In my model, the issuer does not gain from hiding unfavorable ratings as opposed to other
models in which different assumptions give rise to rating shopping. Rating shopping refers to the
issuers’ strategy to cherry-pick the most favorable ratings. In Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and
Bolton et al. (2012), issuers hide unfavorable ratings to deceive nave investors. In Sangiorgi et al.
(2009), issuers publish only the most favorable ratings to attract investors who are legally required
to invest only in high-rated securities. Rating shopping does not take place in my model because
6buyers are considered to be fully rational, and cannot be systematically deceived in equilibrium.
Finally, the informativeness of the signal observed in my model by the rating agencies is ex-
ogenous. The incentives for the raters to acquire information has been considered, among others, in
Bizzotto (2012), Bouvard and Levy (2012), and Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2013).
The theoretical literature on rating agencies is matched by a growing number of empirical stud-
ies.6 These papers address questions including whether credit ratings influence the price of rated
products, and the effect of new agencies on the quality of ratings by incumbents. Using a sample
of residential mortgage-backed securities issued before the financial crisis, Ashcraft et al. (2012)
show that credit ratings did influence prices. Becker and Milbourn (2011) measure the effect of
the sequential entry of Fitch in separate corporate-ratings markets on the quality of the ratings from
incumbent agencies. They show that when a new competitor enters the market, the informative con-
tent of the incumbents’ ratings is reduced. They explain their finding by suggesting that reputational
incentives decrease when competition increases. Xia (2012) considers the entry of Egan-Jones Rat-
ing Company, an investor-paid rating agency, in the market for corporate rating, and comes to the
opposite conclusion. This study shows that the ratings of the incumbents became more strict and
more responsive to information after the entry of a new competitor. Doherty et al. (2012) study the
entry of S&P in the market for insurance ratings and focuses on the ratings of the new agency. They
show that S&P set higher standards than incumbent agencies for securities that received the same
rating.
6A comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on credit rating agencies is beyond the scope of this section;
White (2010), Jeon ad Lovo (2013) and Dranove and Jin (2010) provide comprehensive reviews of the subject.
7The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the monopoly case. The
competition case is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 compares the different equilibria obtained in
Section 2 and 3. Section 5 discusses an extension. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained in
the appendix.
1.2 Monopoly
In this section, I characterize the equilibria in a market with a single rating agency. In the next
sections, I will compare the equilibria in a competition regime to the monopoly benchmark.
1.2.1 The Model
I characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a two-period game. In every period, a new issuer has
an indivisible unit of a security of quality qt ∈ {B,G} with N ≥ 2 potential buyers. A monopolistic
rating agency is the only agent active in both periods. The security is worthless to the issuer and the
agency. To the buyers, the security is worth 1 if qt = G and 0 otherwise. The security’s quality is
endogenous and unobservable.
At the beginning of period t ∈ {1,2}, the rating agency announces its fee φMt ≥ 0 to rate the
security. The issuer decides whether to hire the rating agency. The agency is hired to assign a
rating rMt ∈ {g,b} identical to its signal of quality to be observed later on. Only after deciding
whether to hire the agency does the issuer choose an effort et ∈ [0,1]. Let the issuer’s effort cost be
c(et) : [0,1]→ R+. Effort ensures Pr{qt = G}= et and satisfies c ∈C1, c′, c′′′ ≥ 0, and c′′ > 0, for
all et ∈ [0,1].7 Moreover, c(0) = c′(0) = 0 and c′(1)> 1. Once the security’s quality is realized, the
7The unusual assumption c′′′ ≥ 0 ensures the uniqueness of the issuer’s optimal choice of effort.
8rating agency and the issuer observe at no cost a signal sMt ∈ {g,b} correlated with qt as follows:
Pr{sMt =g|qt}=

1 if qt = G,
pi if qt = B,
for some pi ∈ (0,1). This order of actions is particularly suited to describe the rating process of
structured finance products. These products are often modified (for example, by adding credit en-
hancements) after one or more agencies are hired to rate them. In general, the order describes any
market in which the certifiers can commit to their certification fees before the sellers decide how
much to invest in quality of their products.
The rating agency can be one of two types. With probability µ1 ∈ (0,1), the rating agency is an
honest type that always assigns a rating identical to the signal of quality. With probability 1− µ1,
the agency is strategic. Upon observing a b signal, a strategic agency can request a monetary bribe
βMt > 0 to renege on the original contract. If the issuer pays the bribe, then rMt = g. Let hMt ∈ [0,1]
denote the probability that a strategic agency does not request a bribe upon observing a b signal.
The initial reputation µ1 satisfies the following condition.
Assumption 1. µ1 > c
′′(0)−1+pi
c′′(0)(1+pi)/(1−pi)−1 .
In equilibrium, Assumption 1 ensures that in every period the issuer has an incentive to exert a
strictly positive amount of effort. This assumption rules out equilibria in which the issuer exerts no
effort.
9Finally, the issuer can decide whether to publish the rating or conceal it.8 The potential buyers
only observe the rating, or the lack thereof, and the rating fee. They simultaneously bid for the
security. Let bidi(rMt ,φMt ) denote buyer it’s bid. The winning bid determines the security’s price
p(rMt ,φMt |µMt ,hM∗t ). At the end of every period, the quality of the security is observed by all the
agents. Figure 1.1 summarizes the timeline.
Figure 1.1: Timeline: Monopoly
The issuer and buyers active in the second period observe the rating assigned as well as the
quality of the security in the first period. µ2(rMt ,qt) denotes their updated belief about the agency’s
type.
The equilibrium concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium does not restrict beliefs out of the
equilibrium path. Nevertheless, I impose a restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to rule out
equilibria in which buyers arbitrarily pay no attention to the rating.
Assumption 2. Upon observing an out-of-equilibrium rating fee φMt , the issuer’s and buyers’ beliefs
about the agency’s type are identical to their prior beliefs. Moreover, upon observing an out-of-
equilibrium rating, buyers hold beliefs consistent with the effort choice (e∗t ) and with the agency’s
rating strategy (hM∗t ).
8If a rating is not published, I use the notation rMt = /0.
10
The payoff functions complete the model. The payoff of issuer It amounts to
U It = p(rt ,φ
M
t |µt ,hM∗t )− Iφt φMt −Aβt Iβt βMt − c(et),
where Iφt , I
β
t ∈ {0,1} denote, respectively, the issuer’s decision to hire the agency and to pay a bribe,
while Aβt ∈ {0,1} denotes the agency’s decision to request a bribe. If buyer n purchases the security,
the payoff amounts to
Unt = 1{qt=G}− p(rMt ,φMt |µMt ,hM∗t ).
If the buyer does not purchase the security, Unt = 0. Finally, the rating agency’s payoff consists of a
discounted sum of fees and bribes:
UM = uM1 (φ
M
1 ,β
M
1 ,A
β
1 )+δu
M
2 (φ
M
2 ,β
M
2 ,A
β
2 ),
uM1 (φ
M
1 ,β
M
1 ,A
β
1 ) = I
φ
t φMt +A
β
t I
β
t βMt ,
for some δ > 0. I allow the discount factor to be larger than 1 because the second period is a reduced
form of all future periods in which the rating agency is active.
1.2.2 The Equilibria
I first consider the equilibrium of a single-period game, in which a strategic agency rates honestly
with some exogenous probability h ∈ [0,1). Buyers form their beliefs by observing the rating fee
and the rating, or the lack thereof. The price paid for the security depends on the buyers’ beliefs
about its quality as described in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. The price of the security equals its expected value:
11
p(g,φMt |µt ,h) = e
∗
t (µt ,h)
e∗t (µt ,h)+(1−e∗t (µt ,h))Pr{rMt =g,φMt |qt=B,µt ,h} , (1.1)
p(b,φMt |µt ,h) = p( /0,φMt |µt ,h) = 0,
where e∗t (µt ,h) denotes the equilibrium effort of the issuer.
An unfavorable rating and a lack of rating lead to the same price, so the issuer is indifferent
about the publication of an unfavorable rating.9
The issuer decides how much effort to devote to a security’s quality by weighing a deterministic
cost and a stochastic benefit. If the agency is not hired, the issuer has no reason to exert costly effort.
If instead the agency is hired, effort increases the probability of obtaining a favorable rating without
incurring the cost of a bribe. The expected amount of the bribe determines the issuer’s choice of
effort. In equilibrium, if a strategic agency requests a bribe, it sets the highest bribe that the issuer
is willing to pay. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the bribe amounts to
βM∗t (µt ,h) = p(g|µt ,h).
In equilibrium, the bribe is paid whenever it is requested. If the issuer pays to obtain a rating for the
security, her payoff equals
U It = (et +(1− et)pi)p(g|µt ,h)− c(et)−φMt . (1.2)
The issuer’s choice of effort maximizes the utility defined in (1.2):
e∗t (µt ,h) = e((1−pi)p(g|µt ,h)), where e(.) := c′−1(.). (1.3)
9As in equilibrium the security price does not depend on the rating fee, I drop φt from the argument of p(rt ,φt) in
the rest of the section.
12
The issuer’s effort and security price are mutually consistent. Assumption 1 implies that there is at
most one unique positive level of effort, and a corresponding price, which satisfy the two equations.
Lemma 2. A pair e∗t (µt ,h), p(g|µt ,h)> 0 that satisfy (1.1) and (1.3) exists for any h ∈ [0,1] iff
µt(φt)> µM := 1/(1−pi)−1/c′′(0). (1.4)
These e∗t (µt ,h) and p(g|µt ,h) are unique. e∗t (µt ,h) = p(g|µt ,h) = 0 satisfy (1.1), (1.3) for any
µt(φt) ∈ [0,1].
Lemma 2 states that the presence of a rating agency with a high reputation is necessary but not
sufficient to ensure an issuer’s effort. Nevertheless, the next assumption rules out equilibria in which
the issuer and the buyers coordinate on e∗t (µt ,h) = p(g|µt ,h) = 0.
Assumption 3. Whenever the agency’s reputation satisfies (1.4), the issuer and the buyers coor-
dinate on e∗t (µt ,h)> 0 and p(g|µt ,h)> 0.
A rating is valuable because it allows a profitable investment in quality. The monopolist agency,
regardless of its type, extracts the entire surplus generated by investment in effort with its rating
fee.10
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, the rating agency, regardless of its type, requires the highest fee that the
issuer is willing to pay:
φM∗t (µt ,h) =
(
e∗t (µt ,h)+(1− e∗t (µt ,h))pi
)
p(g|µt ,h)− c(e∗t (µt ,h)).
Lemma 3 implies that the rating fee in equilibrium does not reveal any information about the
type of the agency and concludes the description of the single-period equilibrium. Before consider-
10I rule out equilibria in which the agency follows a weakly dominated strategy and requests a fee larger than what
the issuer is willing to pay for a rating.
13
ing the complete two-period model, I illustrate the effect of the expected honesty h on the investment
in effort for a quadratic cost of effort.
QUADRATIC COST EXAMPLE. Let c(e) = e2. Figure 1.2 shows equilibrium price and effort for
h = 0 and h = 1.
Figure 1.2: Effort choices and prices for pi = 1/5 and µ = 9/10
The intersections of the two curves correspond to the equilibria of the static game. For larger h
the equilibrium with effort is characterized by a more effort and a higher price. The honesty of the
agency determines the price that buyers are willing to pay for any expected level of effort. Indirectly,
it also determines the equilibrium choice of effort.
I can now characterize the probability that a strategic agency will request a bribe. A strategic
agency does not care about its reputation after the last period, and so requests a bribe whenever
sM2 = b. In the first period a strategic agency is faced with a trade-off: to collect a bribe or to
assign an unfavorable rating in order to maintain a good reputation. In the last period the reputation
determines the expected payoff for a strategic agency. This payoff is
14
uMs2 (µ
M
2 ,h
M∗
2 ) = φ
∗
2 (µ
M
2 ,h
M∗
2 )+Pr{s2 = b|e∗2}β ∗2 (µM2 ,hM∗2 ), where hM∗2 = 0.
If the agency is hired in the first period, its reputation is updated to µM2 (rM1 |hM∗1 ).11 The updated
reputation equals
µ2(rM1 |hM∗1 ) =

µ1
µ1+(1−µ1)hM∗1
:= µb(hM∗1 ) if rM1 ∈ {b, /0},
µ1pi
pi+(1−pi)(1−µ1)(1−hM∗1 )
:= µg(hM∗1 ) if rM1 = g and q1 = B,
µ1 if rM1 = g and q1 = G.
(1.5)
Assumption 1 ensures that µg(0) > µM. As µg(0) is the worst possible reputation, in every
period, positive effort can be sustained in equilibrium. Proposition 4 characterizes the equilibria of
the entire game.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, the rating agency is hired in every period. In the last period hM∗2 = 0,
while in the initial period hM∗1 = 0 iff δ ≤ δ
M
, where
δ
M
:=
βM1 (µ1,0)
uMs2 (µb(0),0)−uMs2 (µg(0),0)
.
For δ > δ
M
, hM∗1 satisfies the implicit function
δuMs2 (µ
b(hM∗1 ),0) = β
M
1 (µ1,h
M∗
1 )+δu
M
2 (µ
g(hM∗1 ),0).
For a small discount factor (δ ≤ δM), reputation motives do not discipline a strategic rating
agency. In contrast, for δ > δ
M
, a strategic rating agency rates honestly with a positive probability.
The following corollary describes how the rating strategy depends on δ .
11If in equilibrium the agency is not hired in the first period, then µM2 (r
M
1 |hM∗1 ) = µ1.
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Corollary 1. ∂hM∗1 /∂δ > 0 for δ > δ
M
and lim
δ→∞
hM∗1 = 1. Moreover ∂δ
M
/∂µ1 > 0.
For larger values of δ , the strategic type mimics more closely the honest type. Corollary 1 also
states that a strategic agency is more likely to request a bribe in the first period if the agency has
a better reputation. I characterize the equilibrium strategies of the issuer and the buyers in case of
quadratic cost function.
QUADRATIC COST EXAMPLE. Figure 1.3 shows the probability that a strategic agency does not
request a bribe upon observing sM1 = b. As stated in Corollary 1, for larger values of δ , a strategic
agency more closely mimics the ratings of the honest type. Figure 1.4 shows the equilibrium level
of the issuer’s effort as a function of the rating agency’s discount factor. As hM∗1 increases, the
corresponding level of effort increases.
h1M*H∆L
2 4 6 ∆
0.5
1
h1M*
Figure 1.3: hM∗1 as a function of δ , for
µ1 = 9/10 and pi = 1/5
e1
*Hh1M*L
e1
*H1L
2 4 6 ∆
0.4
e1
*
Figure 1.4: e∗1 as a function of δ , for µ1 =
9/10 and pi = 1/5
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1.3 Competition
In this section, I present the equilibria in a market with two rating agencies that rate simultaneously
and non-cooperatively.
1.3.1 The Model
In the competition regime, two rating agencies, denoted AI and AII , are present on the market. The
types of the agencies are independent, and every agency is an honest type with probability µ1. The
two agencies act simultaneously and the sequence of actions is identical to the monopoly model.
The issuer can hire one agency or both, and the agencies observe two conditionally independent
signals, sIt and s
II
t , distributed as the monopoly one. Figure 1.5 describes the timeline. Assumption
1, 2, and 3 hold also under competition, and the payoffs are defined as in the monopoly case.
Figure 1.5: Timeline: Competition
1.3.2 The Equilibria
I first consider a single-period model in which the strategic agencies rate honestly with probabilities
H := [h
I
,h
II
] ∈ [0,1)2. When two rating agencies are available, the issuer can hire one, two or none.
The next lemma ensures that in equilibrium both rating agencies are hired.
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Lemma 5. In equilibrium, the issuer hires both rating agencies. Accordingly, two favorable ratings
are necessary to obtain a positive price:
p(g,g,Φt |Mt ,H) = e
∗
t (Φt)
e∗t (Φt)+(1− e∗t (Φt))Pr{Rt = [g,g]|qt = B,Mt ,H}
, (1.6)
p(Rt ,Φt |Mt ,H) = 0 if rit ∈ { /0,b} for some i ∈ {I, II}.
Multiple features of my model ensure that the issuer will not hire only a single agency.12 First
of all, an additional rating cannot decrease the price paid for the security because the issuer can hide
any unfavorable ratings. Moreover, Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that two favorable ratings are a
stronger signal that qt = G than a single favorable rating. Finally, the rating agencies can observe
the quality signal at no cost. This extreme assumption captures the low marginal cost of the rating
process. Consider an hypothetical equilibrium in which the issuer is expected to exert effort and hire
one agency. Agencies would compete to be hired and lower their fees. Fees would be low enough
to make it convenient for the issuer to hire a second agency.
As the issuer is expected to hire both agencies, she is indifferent about publishing unfavorable
ratings. If an unfavorable rating is published, buyers infer that qt = B. If less than two ratings are
published, the buyers correctly infer that the issuer is hiding one or more unfavorable ratings, and
therefore qt = B. This result contrasts with the models of rating shopping developed by Bolton et al.
(2012) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009)). In these models, hiding bad ratings is profitable because
some buyers are nave and do not suspect that only the best ratings are published. To my knowledge,
Bouvard and Levy (2012) is the only other model in which a seller can hire more than one rating
agency, and buyers are fully rational. In their model all the raters are hired if the cost for rating
12As in monopoly, the security price does not depend on the rating fee, so I drop Φt from p(Rt ,Φt).
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agencies to obtain a quality signal is small enough.13
A security price larger than zero requires two favorable ratings. Accordingly, the issuer bribes
agency Ai only if the other agency observes a favorable signal (s−it = g), or if the two agencies can
be bribed at a total cost not exceeding the value of the favorable ratings (β It +β IIt ≤ p(g,g|Mt ,H)).
As a result, a strategic agency faces a trade-off. A small bribe is paid even if the issuer needs to
bribe the other agency at the same time, while a high bribe is paid only if the other agency observes
a favorable signal. The next lemma characterizes the choice of bribes.
Lemma 6. Either both agencies request “high” bribes β I∗t = β II∗t = p(g,g|Mt ,H) or they both
request “low” bribes β I∗t ,β II∗t : β I∗t +β II∗t = p(g,g|Mt ,H).
In equilibrium, the rating agencies coordinate their bribes. A “low” bribe β it < p(g,g|Mt ,H)
maximizes Ai’s expected revenue only if the other agency requests a low bribe β−1t = p(g,g|Mt ,H)−
β it . Moreover, low bribes are the best response only if every agency believes its competitor is strate-
gic with a large enough probability. Rating agencies learn more about each others’ types than buyers
and issuer do. Let µ−i(i)t denote Ai’s belief about the competitor’s type, at the beginning of period t.
The next lemma provides a necessary condition for low bribes to be selected in equilibrium.
Lemma 7. Bribes β I∗t ,β II∗t : β I∗t +β II∗t = p(g,g|Mt ,H) are selected in equilibrium only if
µ j(i)t ≤
1−2pi
1−pi .
I proceed to characterize the single-period equilibrium in case the agencies request high bribes.
By hiring the two agencies, the issuer ensures an expected payoff equal to
13The other models of competition between rating agencies (Strausz (2005), Lo (2010), Camanho and Deb (2012),
and Donaldson and Piacentino (2012)) exogenously limit the issuer to hiring only one agency.
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U I = (e∗t +(1− e∗t )pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H)− c(e∗t )−φ It −φ IIt . (1.7)
The choice of effort maximizes the expected payoff of the issuer:
e∗t (Φt) = e((1−pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H)). (1.8)
As stated in the next lemma, Assumption 1 ensures that an equilibrium with positive effort exists
for any H. As both ratings are necessary, I only consider equilibria in which the two rating agencies
set identical rating fees.
Assumption 4. I consider only equilibria in which φ It = φ IIt ∀t.
With their fees, the rating agencies can extract the entire surplus generated by the issuer’s effort,
as stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 8. In the single-period game’s equilibrium, the issuer exerts positive effort. The rating
agencies require the highest fee that the issuer is willing to pay:
φ It = φ
II
t = [(e
∗+(1− e∗)pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H)− c(e∗)]/2. (1.9)
In Appendix A, I characterize the equilibrium of the one-period game in which the rating agen-
cies coordinate on “low” bribes. The next lemma states that the low-bribes equilibrium is charac-
terized by less effort than the high-bribes one.
Lemma 9. For any H ∈ [0,1)2, the equilibrium level of effort is lower if rating agencies coordinate
on “low” bribes than in the case of high bribes.
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Low bribes induce lower effort for two reasons. First, the issuer can simultaneously bribe the
two agencies only if the bribes are low. Therefore, when agencies request low bribes, a low-quality
security has a larger probability of receiving two favorable ratings than in the case of high bribes.
This results in a lower price for a security that receives two favorable ratings than in case of agencies
requesting high bribes. A lower expected price, in turn, reduces the issuer’s incentive to invest in
quality. Moreover, obtaining favorable ratings when the signals are unfavorable is cheaper under
low bribes. By reducing the difference between the payoffs following favorable and unfavorable
signals, low bribes reduce even more the incentive to invest in effort.
QUADRATIC COST EXAMPLE. Figure 1.6 shows the equilibrium price following two favorable
ratings and the issuer’s effort, when agencies coordinate on high and low bribes.
Figure 1.6: Equilibrium effort choice and market price for pi = 1/8 and µ It = µ IIt = 7/10
When the agencies are expected to request low bribes: (i) the buyers pay a lower price for any
expected e∗ and (ii) the issuer exerts less effort for any expected price.
Consider the equilibria of the two-period game. By Lemma 7, low bribes are mutually consistent
only if the agencies’ reputations satisfy µ−i(i)t ≤ (1− 2pi)/(1−pi). In general, low bribes ensure
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larger payoffs than high bribes if every agency believes that the competitor is strategic with a high
probability. The next assumption allows me to focus on equilibria in which agencies coordinate on
low bribes if their reputations for honesty are low.
Assumption 5. I only consider equilibria in which the rating agencies coordinate on low bribes in
period t iff their reputations satisfy µ I(II)t , µ
II(I)
t ≤ µ for some µ ∈ [0,(1−2pi)/(1−pi)].
In the rest of the section, I characterize the equilibrium in which the rating agencies request high
bribes in both periods. Then, I show that this equilibrium ensures more effort in the first period than
any equilibrium which involves low bribes. I start characterizing the equilibrium with high bribes
from the rating decisions of a strategic agency. In the last period, a strategic agency requests a bribe
whenever possible, while in the first period a strategic agency faces a trade-off between a better
reputation and a bribe. The reputations are updated to µ i2(R1,q1).
14 The reputation in the second
period satisfies
µ i2(R1,q1) =

µ1
µ1+(1−µ1)hi∗1
:= µ i,b(hi∗1 ) if r
i
1 = b and r
−i
1 = g,
µ1(pi+(1−pi)(1−µ1)(1−h−i∗1 ))
pi+(1−pi)(1−µ1)∑I,II(1−hn∗1 ) := µ
i,g(H∗1 ) if r
i
1 = r
−i
1 = g and q1 = B,
µ1 otherwise.
(1.10)
Because the two agencies rate simultaneously, a competitor’s rating provides information about
an agency’s type. For example, the second-period agents interpret a rating ri1 = g for a security of
14Under competition, agencies learn more about each other than other agents do, but their strategies in the second
period only depend on an agency’s reputation among issuer and buyers.
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quality q1 = B differently depending on the rating assigned by the other agency. As the issuer bribes
an agency only if the other agency receives a signal g, a favorable rating is interpreted as an honest
mistake if the other agency publishes an unfavorable rating r−i1 = b. If instead the other agency also
assigns a favorable rating, then the rating ri1 = g could be the result of a mistake or a bribe.
Assumption 1 ensures that the agencies’ reputations are sufficiently high to support effort in
every period. Therefore, in the second period a strategic-agency’s payoff amounts to
uis2 (M2) :=φ
i
2+(1− e∗2)pi(1−pi)β i2 = [(e∗2+(1− e∗2)pi(2−pi))p(g,g|M2,0,0)− c(e∗2)]/2.
The strategic-agency’s payoff in the second period depends on the reputations of both agencies. A
monopolistic agency that accepts a bribe in the first period only lowers its own expected revenues.
In competition, a lower reputation for either agency lowers the revenues of both agencies. The next
proposition characterizes the equilibrium in which the rating agencies coordinate on high bribes in
both periods.
Proposition 10. If in equilibrium the rating agencies coordinate on high bribes, every issuer hires
both rating agencies. For every i ∈ {I, II}, the probability that a strategic agency rates honestly is
hi∗2 = 0 and
hi∗1 =

0 if δ ≤ δ c,
hc(δ ) otherwise,
where δ
c
:= p(g,g|M1,0,0)
uis2 (µ
i,b
2 (0),µ1)−uis2 (µ i,g(0,0),µ i,g(0,0))
and hc(δ ) is defined by the implicit function:
δ =
p(g,g|M1,(hc(δ ),hc(δ )))
uis2 (µ i,b(hc(δ )),µ
−i
1 )−uis2 (µ i,g(hc(δ ),hc(δ )),µ−i,g(hc(δ ),hc(δ )))
. (1.11)
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In equilibrium the two strategic-type agencies follow the same rating strategy in both periods.
Similarly to the monopoly case, for a low discount factor a strategic agency is not disciplined by the
threat of losing its reputation, while for larger discount factors, the strategic-type mimics the honest
type, as described in the next corollary.
Corollary 2. ∂hi∗1 /∂δ > 0 iff δ ≥ δ
c
, and lim
δ→∞
hi∗1 = 1.
The next lemma is composed of two parts. First, it states that in every equilibrium in which the
rating agencies coordinate on low bribes in some period, they will coordinate on low bribes in the
first period. Moreover, the strategic agencies coordinate on low bribes only if they strictly prefer
to request a bribe. This is the case because an agency that is indifferent between a low bribe and
an honest rating should strictly prefer to request a higher bribe. As a result, in any equilibrium that
involves low bribes the issuer’s effort in the first period is lower than in ther case of high bribes.
Lemma 11. If in equilibrium the rating agencies coordinate on low bribes in the second period,
they also coordinate on low bribes in the first period. Therefore, in any equilibrium in which agen-
cies coordinate on low bribes, hI∗1 = h
II∗
1 = 0 and the first-period effort e
∗
1 is weaker than in the
equilibrium in which agencies request high bribes in every period.
I proceed to compare equilibria in the regime of competition among rating agencies and in the
monopoly regime.
1.4 Comparing Equilibria
In this section, I compare the expected quality of the first-period security under monopoly and
competition. The last-period security is not considered, as the last period amounts to a modeling
device to account for reputational concerns of the rating agencies.
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A different number of rating agencies can result in different amounts of information generated.
My model has little to say about the process through which rating agencies collect their information.
In fact, I even assume away any cost to obtain a signal correlated with quality. Along this line,
I consider different market structures while holding constant the overall amount of information
available to the rating agencies. I compare the effort choice of the issuer when a monopolistic
agency observes two signals of quality and when each of two competing agencies observes a single
signal.
The monopolistic regime and the regime of competition differ in the number of ratings assigned.
Proposition 4 and Lemma 5 ensure that in both regime the issuer requests a rating from every avail-
able rating agency. The regimes also differ in the reputational concerns of the rating agencies. These
two dimensions can be considered in turn. Lemma 12 focuses on the effect of increasing the num-
ber of agencies, while abstracting from their reputational concerns. This lemma compares equilibria
under monopoly and under competition for an exogenously-given probability that a strategic agency
requests a bribe.
Lemma 12. Assume that every agency has a probability µ to be an honest type, and each strategic
agency rates honestly with probability h. Two competing agencies, observing a single signal each
and requesting high bribes, β It = β IIt = p(g,g|.), induce more issuer’s effort than a monopolistic
agency observing two signals.
Figure 1.7 gives an intuitive explanation. Under competition a strategic agency is less likely to
be bribed. In fact, under competition the issuer agrees to pay a bribe to agency Ai only if agency
A−i observes a favorable signal, that is, s−it = g. When both agencies observe an unfavorable signal,
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however, their ratings reveal the signals to the buyers, whether or not either agency requested a
bribe. In contrast, a bribe is paid whenever it is requested under the monopoly regime.
Figure 1.7: Ratings for exogenous µ and h
The next proposition compares monopoly and competition assuming that Assumption 1 holds
for pi = pi2.
Proposition 13. Let competing agencies coordinate on high bribes. If pi > 1/3, there is a unique
discount factor δ ∗ at which a monopolistic agency and two competing agencies both ensure the
same effort in the first period. The monopolistic agency ensures a higher effort iff δ > δ ∗.
Proposition 13 is the main result of the paper. It states that monopoly can induce more effort
than competition with high bribes if the reputational incentives are strong. It also gives a sufficient
condition to ensure that, for a large enough discount factor, the monopolist is indeed more infor-
mative than the two competitors. Intuitively, if the signal is often wrong (large pi) the reputation
update of the monopolist is larger than the reputation update of the competitors. At the same time,
the monopolist’s reputational motives are stronger because the payoff of the monopolist is more
dependent on its reputation than the payoffs of competitors.
QUADRATIC COST EXAMPLE. Figure 1.8 describes the equilibrium choice of effort for a quadratic
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cost function.
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Figure 1.8: Effort in the first period for µ1 = 15/16 and pi = 1/2
Effort choice under monopoly is lower for low values of δ . In particular if δ < min
{
δ
M
,δ
C
}
,
in both regimes a strategic agency requests a bribe whenever possible. In this case, Lemma 12
ensures that the buyers are more informed and the issuer has more incentive to invest in effort under
rating agency competition. As the issuer’s choice of effort is a continuous function of the agencies’
discount factor, competition induces more effort than monopoly for any δ below a threshold.
1.5 Extension: Identical Signals
Will an issuer exert more effort when competing agencies observe identical signals of quality or
when they observe conditionally independent signals of quality? Should policy makers incentivize
standardization in the methods used to evaluate financial products? On the one hand, the presence
of a competitor observing the same signal of quality can deter an agency from assigning undeserved
ratings. On the other hand, agencies following different procedures might have stronger reputational
incentives. In this section, I consider competition among rating agencies which observe the same
27
signals of quality. I proceed then to compare equilibria in a regime of competition where agencies
observe identical signals, and where agencies observe conditionally independent signals.
Consider the single-period game with exogenous rating strategies H and quality signals sIt =
sIIt := st . Lemma 5 does not depend on the correlation between the signals observed by the rating
agencies. As a result, two ratings are necessary to ensure a price larger than zero even if the rating
agencies observe the same signal.
A security may receive two favorable ratings if each of the agencies observes a favorable signal.
Two favorable ratings can also be the result of two bribes. When two agencies observe the same
signal, the issuer either bribes both agencies, or neither of them. The issuer will pay the bribes only
if β It +β IIt ≤ p(g,g|Mt ,H). I only consider symmetric equilibria, in which agencies request bribes
β It = β IIt = p(g,g|Mt ,H)/2. The next lemma provides a sufficient condition to ensure that there is
an equilibrium with positive effort.
Lemma 14. A pair p(g,g|Mt ,H)> 0 and e∗ > 0 that satisfies (1.1) and
e∗t (Φt) = e((1−pi)p(g,g|Mt ,H)) (1.12)
exists for any H iff
(1−µ It )(1−µ IIt )< 1/c′′(0)−pi/(1−pi). (1.13)
This pair is unique. e∗t = p(g,g|Mt ,H) = 0 satisfy (1.1) and (1.12) for any Mt .
Lemma 15 compares the equilibria of a single period game under competition with different
signal structures. I hold constant the overall amount of information received by the rating agencies
in the two regimes. This amounts to assuming that under both regimes two signals of quality are
generated.
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Lemma 15. In the equilibrium of the single period game, the issuer exerts more effort when agen-
cies receive identical signals than when agencies receive conditionally independent signals if
∑i(1−µ it )(1−hi)
∏i(1−µ it )(1−hi)
≥ 1+pi
pi
.
When agencies observe conditionally independent signals, they either coordinate on high or low
bribes, as described in Section 4. If agencies coordinate on low bribes, the issuer has less incentive
to exert effort than in the regime of identical signals of quality. Consider the equilibria in which
the agencies coordinate on high bribes. Figure 1.9 compares the ratings in the two informational
regimes. When the two signals are different, buyers are more likely to observe an unfavorable rating
if each agency observes both signals. In contrast, if the two signals are identical and unfavorable,
agencies that observe independent signals are more reliable: as the agencies coordinate on high
bribes, they cannot be bribed at the same time. As a result, in case of two unfavorable signals, the
agencies can be bribed only in the regime of identical signals.
Figure 1.9: Ratings for exogenous H under different informational regimes
Consider the two-period game. In the last period, the reputation of the rating agencies among
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the other agents is updated to µ i2(R1,q1).
15 In this case, the second period reputation satisfies
µ i2(R1,q1) =

µ1
Pr{R1=(b,b)|H∗1 ,s1=b} := µ
i,b(H∗1 ) for r
I
1 = r
II
1 = b,
µ1pi
Pr{R1=(g,g)|H∗1 ,q1=B} := µ
i,g(H∗1 ) for r
I
1 = r
II
1 = g and q1 = B,
µ1 otherwise.
(1.14)
The payoff of a strategic agency in the second period depends on the reputation of both agencies.
The agency’s reputation among the issuer and the buyers determines, respectively, the choice of
effort and the willingness to pay for the security. The belief about the type of the competitor deter-
mines the expected probability of receiving a bribe. The continuation payoff equals
ui2(M2,µ
−i(i)
2 ) := φ
i
2+(1− e2)(1−pi)(1−µ−i(i)2 )β i2/2.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 16. In equilibrium, for every i ∈ {I, II},
hi1 =

0 if δ ≤ δ s,
hs1(δ ) otherwise.
δ
s
and hs1(δ ) are defined, respectively, by:
δ
s
=
p(g,g|M1,0,0)
ui2(µ
i,b
2 (0),µ
i,b
2 (0),0)−ui2(µ i,g(0,0),µ j,g(0,0),0)
,
δ =
p(g,g|M1,hs1(δ ),hcs1 (δ ))
ui2(µ i,b(h
s
1(δ )),µ
i,b
2 (h
s
1(δ )),0)−ui2(µ i,g(hs1(δ ),hcs1 (δ )),0)
.
15Agencies can learn about each others’ type more than the other agents do, but in equilibrium the belief about the
type of the competing agency will not be determinant for the choice of action of each agency.
30
As in the regime of conditionally independent signals, there is a threshold discount factor δ
s
.
If and only if δ < δ
s
, a strategic agency strictly prefers to obtain a bribe in the first period. Note
that δ
s
and hs1(δ ) are defined by the indifference condition of a strategic rating agency. The next
corollary is the equivalent of Corollary 2.
Corollary 3. If δ > δ
cs , then ∂hi∗1 /∂δ > 0 and limδ→∞
hi∗1 = 1, ∀i.
Proposition 17 compares the equilibrium effort under monopoly and under competition. I con-
sider only the case of issuers endowed with a quadratic cost function.
Proposition 17. Let c(et) = e2t . If every competing rating agency observes both signals, there is a
unique δ ∗∗ < δ
cs for which a monopolistic agency and competing agencies induce the same effort
choice in the first period. The issuer exerts more effort in the monopoly regime iff δ > δ ∗∗.
The competition regime ensures more effort than monopoly for low discount factors. Proposi-
tion 17 ensures that this is the case regardless of the signal structure. Figure 1.10 shows a numerical
example.
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Figure 1.10: First-period effort under monopoly and competition (identical signals)
The next lemma compares the threshold discount factors obtained by comparing effort under
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competition for the two signal structures and effort under monopoly.
Lemma 18. Let c(et) = e2t . Then δ ∗∗ > δ ∗ iff µ1 > 1−2pi1+pi .
Identical-signal competition ensures more effort than monopoly for a larger set of δ than independent-
signal competition for large values of µ1 and pi . Identical signals ensure that each agency observes
more information. If the agencies are likely to be honest, identical signals ensure more informative
ratings than independent signals.
1.6 Conclusion
My paper represents the first attempt to simultaneously consider rating agencies’ reputational in-
centives and issuers’ investments in the quality of their securities. I show that competition among
agencies can ensure more investment in a security’s quality than monopoly whenever the rating
agencies have weak reputational incentives. Reputational incentives can be weak for many reasons.
For example, while rating new or complex securities, rating agencies are likely to make many honest
mistakes. As a result, inflated ratings will pass unnoticed and will not hurt the agencies’ reputations
for rating honestly. If the number of new securities to be rated is very high, the reputational incen-
tives can be weak because many ratings are issued before the returns of the securities are observed.
The markets for asset-backed securities in the years preceding the financial crisis are an example
of market in which a large volume of new and complex securities were rated in a short amount of
time, and rating agencies were likely to lack reputational concerns. Therefore, my model supports
the regulators’ claims that increasing rating competition is in the public interest in these markets.
Other certification models with endogenous product quality (Albano and Lizzeri (2001) and
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Donaldson and Piacentino (2012)) conclude that competition always ensures more investment in
security quality than monopoly does. These models differ from mine primarily because their cer-
tifiers do not have reputational incentives. Models that do consider reputational incentives, such
as Strautz (2005), Lo (2010) and Camanho and Deb (2012), conclude that a monopolistic agency
always ensures more information for investors than competing agencies. Unlike my model, these
papers consider ratings for products of exogenous quality and limit the issuer to hiring at most a
single rating agency.
My analysis could be extended to consider competition between more than two rating agencies.
In my setting, the issuer hires all the available rating agencies, regardless of their number. The
analysis, however, becomes significantly more complicated when more than two rating agencies are
available. This is because strategic agencies can coordinate their bribes in many different ways, and
the number of possible equilibria increases quite rapidly.
In my model, the structure of the securities market is exogenously determined. After agencies
announce their rating fees, a single issuer decides on her effort. It would be interesting, however,
to explicitly model the issuer’s decision to enter the securities market, and therefore consider the
effect of the rating fees on the structure of the securities market. In fact, the rating agencies could
potentially demand low fees in order to encourage multiple issuers to enter the market, or high
fees that result in a monopoly in the securities market. Ultimately, this extension could provide
conditions under which external certifiers should be expected to induce a socially desirable market
structure for rated products.
Chapter 2
Contingent Payments and Certification Quality
This is a major overhaul of the system ... it is a dramatic change.
- Andrew Cuomo on the Cuomo Plan. June, 2008.1
This feels cosmetic to me, ... getting paid for just showing up doesn’t strike me as a good model or
incentive structure.
- Professor Lawrence White on the Cuomo Plan. June, 2008.1
2.1 Introduction
In 2011, the United States Senate produced a report on the causes of the recent financial crisis. An
entire section of this report was devoted to the role of credit rating agencies, which were faulted for
deliberately overlooking factors that induced lower ratings for structured financial products.2 The
following excerpt is illustrative:
Despite the increasing number of ratings issued each year and record revenues as a
result, neither Moody’s nor S&P hired sufficient staff or devoted sufficient resources to
ensure that the initial rating process and the subsequent surveillance process produced
accurate credit ratings.3
1”Cuomo reaches deal with ratings agencies,” Crain’s New York Business, June 5, 2008.
2Coburn Levin Report (2011), Section V. For a complementary account of the role of credit rating agencies in the
recent financial crisis, see Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009).
3Coburn Levin Report (2011), page 304.
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In 2008, Andrew Cuomo, who at the time served as Attorney General of New York, reached an
agreement with the three largest rating agencies to address these issues.4 The agreement was known
as the Cuomo Plan. The Plan prohibited rating agencies from receiving compensation based on
the issuer agreeing to publish an assigned rating. The Plan imposed a fee-for-service compensation
scheme, requiring that issuers pay whenever they requested a rating. My model studies the effect of
the policy on the informational content of ratings. The model has the following features:
• an issuer privately observes the quality (high or low) of her security,
• a monopolistic rating agency, decides whether to:
– observe a signal correlated with the quality of the security, and
– truthfully report this information.
In this model, the quality signal can be high or low, with the agency having the option to assign
a high rating or refusing to rate the product at all. A high rating can be denied only if the agency
observes a low signal. If the agency assigns a high rating to a low-quality security, it incurs a
reputation cost, which is meant to capture the potential damage from a loss of credibility.5 Moreover,
before the policy is introduced, the rating agency can require an ex ante fee, to be paid to request a
rating, and an ex post fee, to be paid only if a high rating is assigned.
The rating agency’s willingness to obtain a signal and to rate honestly will determine the issuer
decision to request a rating. This potential effect is described by an analyst in her evaluation of the
4The agreement was signed by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.
5The argument that the value of ratings derives from the rating agency’s desire to maintain a good reputation is
commonly accepted but not immune to critiques. Hunt (2008) and Partnoy (2001) propose an alternative explanation,
based on the legal value attributed to the rates of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) by the
financial regulatory system.
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consequences of Moody’s procedures:
I am worried that we are not able to give these complicated deals the attention they
really deserve, and that they [Credit Suisse, the seller] are taking advantage of the light
review...6
In this work, I demonstrate that by prohibiting contingent ex post fees, the Cuomo Plan incen-
tivizes the agency to obtain the quality signal and dissuades it from assigning a high rating upon
observing a low signal. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, the rating agency obtains the costly signal less
often as a result of the Plan. This is the case because a fee that is independent of the rating obtained
reduces the incentive to submit a low-quality security for rating. The reason is straightforward: a
low-quality security is less likely to receive a high rating than a high-quality one. The issuer prefers
an ex ante to an ex post fee regardless of the quality of the security, but the low-quality issuer finds
it particularly convenient to pay the fee ex post.
As the issuer’s reaction to the policy depends on the quality of the security, the expected qual-
ity of securities submitted for certification is thus affected by the policy. The average quality of a
security submitted for rating increases as less low-quality securities are submitted, and as a conse-
quence the agency has a weaker incentive to collect information. Overall, even if the agency is less
informed as a result of the policy, buyers are more informed because a low-quality security is less
likely to receive a high rating.
As might be expected, the Cuomo Plan has an impact on the rating process only if the repu-
tational cost is not already sufficient to discipline the agency. When the reputational cost is high,
6Coburn Levin (2011), page 305.
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it is optimal for the agency to require the entire fee ex ante to discourage issuers of low-quality
securities from requesting a rating.
Less intuitive is the second characterization of the impact of the policy. In the context of low
reputational cost, the effect of the Cuomo Plan depends on the cost of the quality signal:
• If the cost to obtain the signal is so high that in the absence of the policy the agency would
not have any incentive to obtain a signal of quality and therefore would just blindly assign a
high rate, then the policy has no effect.
• If, on the other hand, there is a low cost of effort, the Plan then reduces the probability of a
low-quality security receiving a high rating, as described above.
Based on this assessment, it is clear therefore that while the Cuomo Plan is likely to reduce in-
formation asymmetries in markets in which rating agencies have weak reputational incentives, it is
less likely to induce rating agencies to spend the resources necessary to evaluate complex financial
products. To the extent that complex financial products are also characterized by the largest infor-
mation asymmetries between issuers and investors, the Plan might be ineffective when informative
ratings are most needed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the literature.
Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 discusses the equilibria. Section 5 provides a conclusion.
All the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
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2.2 Review of the Literature
The literature on the Cuomo Plan thus far (Bolton et. al (2012), Kovbasyuk (2010), Bouvard and
Levy (2009)) does not consider how the procedures followed by rating agencies to assign their
ratings affect the decisions of sellers endowed with products of different quality. Bolton et al. (2012)
show that non-contingent fees would dissuade rating agencies from collecting costly information on
security quality. This conclusion, however, directly contradicts what my model suggests primarily
because different assumptions are being made. In the model proposed by Bolton et al. (2012),
buyers punish a rating agency for lying about the signal observed but not for assigning a rating
based on a misleading signal. In my model, however, buyers are not able to distinguish the two
cases.
According to Kovbasyuk (2011), the Plan can have opposite effects on the quality of ratings.
This effect depends on whether or not the contract between issuer and rating agency can be observed
by the investors. In my model, contracts are non-observable. Kovbasyuk (2011) shows that in this
case the Plan reduces the incentive to assign high ratings to low-quality securities. Bouvard and
Levy (2012) consider a rating market in which contingent fees are banned. They show that rating
agencies, regardless, prefer to inflate their ratings. Rating inflation is motivated by the desire to
attract low-quality issuers.
More generally, recent theoretical research on market credit ratings has taken on a broad focus.
The role of reputation for honesty in disciplining rating agencies is considered in Strausz (2005),
Mathis et al. (2009), and Frenkel (2010). Mariano (2012) argues that reputational motives do not
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necessarily ensure more reliable ratings: rating agencies improve their reputation for expertise by
disregarding their private information and assigning ratings based on public information. Fahri et
al. (2009), Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), Sangiorgi et al. (2009) focus on credit shopping, that
is, the possibility of the issuers to cherry-pick the most favorable ratings. Unsolicited ratings are
considered in Fulghieri et al. (2010). Pagano and Volpin (2009) and Fahri et al. (2009) study the
transparency of rates and Damiano et al. (2008) considers the role of coordination among raters
working for the same credit rating agency. White (2010) and Dranove and Jin (2010) provide
comprehensive reviews on the subject.
The theoretical literature on credit ratings is matched by a limited number of empirical studies.
A notable example is Ashcraft et al. (2011), who study whether credit ratings affect the market price
of rated products. They show that in a sample of residential mortgage-backed securities, issued in
the years preceding the financial crisis, ratings did have an influence on prices.
2.3 The Model
The model I have developed is a game with four players: an issuer, a rating agency, and two buyers.
The issuer owns a unit of a security of quality q ∈ {H,L}. The security is worth 1 to the buyers
if q = H and −1 if q = L. For the other agents the security has no value. The issuer is privately
informed about q. The other agents know that
Pr{q = H}= α ∈ (0,1).
The issuer cannot credibly communicate the quality of the security to the buyers, but she can request
a rating. In order to request a rating, the issuer needs to commit to pay a schedule of non-negative
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fees set by the rating agency. The issuer pays an ex ante fee φI to request a rating, and an ex post
fee φR, only in case a high rating is assigned.
The rating agency can observe a signal θ = q with probability e at a cost c(e) =Ce where C≥ 0.
The rating agency can either assign a high rating or no rating. The agency can refuse to issue a high
rating only if it receives a private signal θ = L.7 If the agency assigns a high rating to a security of
quality L, it incurs a reputation cost ρ > 0. I model reputation as an exogenous cost, as in Bolton
et al. (2012). The other players know that Pr{q = H} = α ∈ (0,1) and observe a public signal
ψ ∈ {L,H} distributed as follows:
Pr{ψ = H|q = H}= 1−β ,
Pr{ψ = H|q = L}= 0.
and observe a public signal ψ ∈ {L,H} distributed as follows:
Pr{ψ = H|q = H}= 1−β ,
Pr{ψ = H|q = L}= 0.
Hence, the expected value of the security for a signal ψ , denoted as Vφ , is:
E(q|ψ = H) :=VH = 1,
E(q|ψ = L) :=VL = αβ−(1−α)αβ+(1−α) < 1.
I assume that the security has a non-negative expected value for the buyers even if ψ = L.
Assumption 1. VL > 0.
7If the agency observes the quality, this is equivalent to a very simple model of quality revelation in which the expert
can either reveal q ∈ {L} or q ∈ {L,H}.
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The time-line of the game is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 2.1: Timeline
The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium. Buyers only observe the public signal and
whether the security is certified. Their bids are given as follows:
bi : {cert,no cert}×{L,H}→ R+∪ /0, for i ∈ {1,2}.
Let 1L = 1 iff q = L. If a buyer gets the security, her payoff equals:
UBi(bi,q) = 1−21L−bi,
and if he does not get the security, UBi(bi,q) = 0. In equilibrium, buyers bid the expected value of
the security, as long as it is non-negative. If ψ = H, the quality of the security is known, and the
certificate has no informative content. If instead ψ = L, the expected value of the security might
depend on the presence of the certificate. For ψ = L, I define the expected value of the security as
v˜c or v˜nc, depending on whether the certificate is issued or not, and I denote the corresponding bids
as bc and bnc, respectively.8 If vc and vnc are defined in equilibrium, then:9
8E.g. v˜c ≡ P{q = H|cert,ψ = L}−P{q = L|cert,ψ = L} and bc ≡ bi(cert, L).
9I.e. whenever certification takes place respectively w.p. > 0 or < 1 .
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
bc = v˜c if v˜c ≥ 0, bc = /0 otherwise,
bnc = v˜nc if v˜nc ≥ 0, bnc = /0 otherwise.
The issuer choice to request a certificate depends on the certification fees:
rq : R2+→{0,1} for q ∈ {H,L}.
I assume, without loss of generality, that the security is sold to one of the buyers that make the
highest bid. The payoff to the issuer is:
US(rq,φI,φR,b) =−rq(φI,φR)(φI +1certφR)+b,
where 1cert = 1 iff certification takes place, and b equals the highest bid if a bid is made, and b = 0
otherwise.
The rating agency’s strategy is given by the fee structure (φI,φR) ∈ R2+, a choice of effort e :
R2+ → [0,1], and a function c : R2+ → [0,1], which defines the probability of certification when
θ = L. The agency’s payoff when the issuer demands the certificate is:
UC(φI,φR,e) =

φI−Ce+φR−1Lρ if the certificate is issued,
φI−Ce otherwise.
If the issuer does not request the certificate, her payoff equals 0.
2.4 The Equilibria
The issuer demands the certificate only if it ensures higher bids for her security. As a consequence,
there exists an equilibrium in which buyers are not willing to bid enough if the certificate is obtained,
and therefore the issuer does not request the certificate.
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Lemma 19. There exists an equilibrium in which certification does not take place.
In this section, I characterize the parameter values for which this equilibrium is not unique.
The General Case
The equilibria for C > 0 are presented here. A preliminary observation is that the rating agency
incurs the cost, e, of the private signal only if the information is a determinant of the decision to
certify.
Lemma 20. For C > 0, if the rating agency chooses e > 0, the certificate is not assigned upon
observing θ = L.
Lemma 2 implies that the informative content of the certificate is determined by the rating
angency’s choice to observe θ . The decision depends on C and ρ . The rating agency does not get
the signal if the cost is too large compared to the loss from losing its reputation.
Proposition 21. If C > (1−α)ρ , the rating agency does not acquire the private signal. An equi-
librium with certification exists iff ρ ≤ βVL/(1−α) and in this equilibrium the certificate is not
informative as the security is always certified, regardless of its quality.
It might seem surprising that a issuer demands a certificate which provides no information to the
buyers, but the certification equilibrium can be sustained by low bids out of the equilibrium path.10
The rest of the section considers the alternative case, C ≤ (1−α)ρ .
I characterize the strategies of issuer and certifier by considering the certification game, defined
as the game between issuer and certifier, for a given pair of bids.
10This equilibrium is similar to the no-disclosure equilibrium described in Lizzeri (1999). The certifier does not reveal
anything, but all the seller types request a certificate.
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Proposition 22. In the certification game, certification takes place only if β (bc− bnc) ≥ C. In
any equilibrium with certification, the certifier announces a fee structure (φI,φR) that satisfies:
φI +φR = β (bc−bnc).
The contingent fee satisfies:
• if β (bc−bnc)< ρ , φR = 0,
• if β (bc−bnc)> ρ , φR ≥ ρ−C/α .
The certifier sets the sum of the two fees to extract the expected gain from certification of the
high-quality issuer. The ex post fee determines the participation of the issuer of a low-quality
security - rL. For a large ex post fee, i.e., φR > ρ −C/(1−α), the rating agency does not collect
any information (e = 0), certifies regardless of the quality; as a consequence rL = 1. For a small ex
post fee (φR ≤ ρ−C/(1−α)), the decision to get a private signal depends on rL. rL in turn depends
on e.
Figure 2.2 shows the effect of a reduction of the ex post fee, on the participation choice of the
low-quality issuer and the rating agency’s effort. The reduction in the ex post fee is matched by an
identical increase in the ex ante fee. As a result, the total fee φI +φR is unchanged.
A lower φR increases the incentive to get a private signal, but in equilibrium the certifier gets the
signal less often. In fact, an unchanged or increased level of effort cannot be part of an equilibrium.
A low-quality issuer, expecting a better informed certifier, would not request the certificate. As a
result, the signal would not provide any information to the certifier.
With regards to Result 2, for β (bc−bnc)< ρ , the expected payoff of the rating agency decreases
if the low-quality issuer demands the certificate. Therefore, the certifier tries to reduce the proba-
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Figure 2.2: Effect of a reduction of φR, for φR ≤ ρ−C/(1−α)
bility of this event, demanding the entire fee ex ante: φR = 0. Below I refer to this equilibrium as
the case of a careful certifier. On the contrary, for β (bc−bnc)> ρ , the certifier sets φR ≥ ρ− C1−α
to ensure rL = 1. This case can be called the careless certifier. Finally, for β (bc− bnc) = ρ , any
rL and, therefore, any ex post fee ensures the same payoff to the certifier: I refer to this case as an
indifferent certifier. The next Proposition describes the equilibria of the game.
Proposition 23. In equilibrium, certification takes place only if C ≤ βρ2β+ρ , and
three types of equilibria exist for different values of ρ and C:
1. If ρ > f2(C), the certifier is careful.
2. If ρ ∈ [ f1(C), f2(C)], the certifier is indifferent.
3. If ρ < f1(C), the certifier is careless.11
Figure 2.3 shows the intervals described in Result 3.
C > βρ/(2β +ρ) is an extreme and not very relevant scenario: there exists no equilibrium with
certification because the fees collected would not compensate the cost of getting the signal or losing
11 f1(x)≡ 12
(
β − x1−β (
αβ+1−α
α(1−α) )+
√
(β − x1−β (
αβ+1−α
α(1−α) ))
2 + 4xβ1−β (
β
1−α − 1α )
)
,
f2(x)≡ β+
√
β 2−8βx
2 .
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Figure 2.3: Equilibria for different values of ρ and C
the rating agency’s reputation. If C ≤ βρ/(2β +ρ) instead, there are equilibria with certification,
in which the informative content of the certificate depends on the size of ρ and C.
If the reputation cost is low (area 3 in Fig. 2), in any equilibrium with certification the rating
agency is careless. This implies that it is demanding a high share of the fee contingent on certi-
fication (φR ≥ ρ −C/(1−α)), thereby inducing the issuer of a low-quality security to request a
certificate. The rating agency obtains the same payoff from certifying the security for any quality
or from collecting a signal and certifying only the high-quality security. As a result, there exists a
continuum of equilibria characterized by a different informative content of the signal - measured by
v˜c.
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Equilibria in which the certificate is more informative - i.e., v˜c is larger - exists for larger ρ . In
fact, for a low reputation cost, if buyers expect the certifier to provide reliable information, their
willingness to pay for a certified security would induce the certifier to certify regardless of the
quality.
For intermediate values of ρ (area 2), i.e., ρ = β (bc−bnc), any choice of φR ensures the same
payoff for the certifier. For higher values of ρ , the certifier demands the entire fee before assigning
the certificate (φR = 0) to minimize the participation of the issuer of a low-quality security. Figure
2.4 below summarizes these observations and shows how v˜c depends on the size of ρ .
Figure 2.4: v˜c as a function of ρ
In any equilibrium rH = 1 and c = 0, and, therefore, the ex ante total welfare is equal to:
W 1(rL,e) = α− (1−α)rL(1− e)(1+ρ)− eC. (2.1)
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The ex ante total welfare is the sum of the expected gain or loss of the buyer from obtaining the
security, and the reputation, as well as the screening cost for the rating agency. Note that when
there are equilibria characterized by different v˜c for a given level of ρ (as happens for ρ ∈ [C/(1−
α), f1(C)]), equilibria with higher v˜c ensure a higher total welfare. Higher v˜c is, in fact, equivalent
to a lower probability that a low-quality security is certified and, therefore, sold.
In equilibrium the marginal cost of effort equals the marginal private benefit of the rating agency,
but is smaller than the social benefit, that is:
C = (1−α)(ρ−φR)< (1−α)(ρ+1).
Therefore, in equilibrium, the rating agency chooses a level of effort lower that the socially optimal
one.
Effect of the Policy
The result below defines the cap on φR that maximizes the informative content of the certificate.
Proposition 24. The optimal cap on the ex post fee is φR = 0. Introducing a cap has an effect on v˜c
only if ρ ≤ f2(C) and C ≤ (1−α)ρ . In this case, a regulation imposing φR = φR = 0 increases the
informative content of the certificate and ensures v˜c = (ρ−2C)/ρ and v˜nc =−1.
If C > (1−α)ρ , the rating agency has no incentive to get the private signal for any φR, and
therefore the regulation has no effect. In particular, the equilibrium presented in Result 2 in which
the certifier exerts no effort and publishes a certificate that has no informative content does not
disappear. Notice that for a high cost C inducing the certifier to obtain the private signal is not
necessarily welfare enhancing. As an extreme case, if C > (1−α)(ρ+1), it is socially optimal for
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the certifier to exert no effort even if rL = 1.
The policy has no effect either if ρ > f2(C). This should not surprise, as Proposition 23 shows
that for large ρ (ρ ≥ f2(C)), in any equilibrium with certification, the rating agency chooses φR = 0
even in the absence of the regulation, in order to reduce the participation of the low-quality issuer.
If ρ < f2(C), imposing a cap ensures a v˜c higher than in any equilibrium described in the last
subsection. The effect of the policy is the result of two components. Eliminating the contingent fee
increases the incentive of the rating agency to get the signal, for any given probability of partici-
pation of the low-quality issuer. At the same time, it reduces the issuer’s incentive to demand the
certificate. The result is a new equilibrium with less effort on the part of the rating agency and a
lower probability that the low-quality issuer requests the certificate, exactly as represented in Fig.
2. The two components have opposite effects on v˜c, but the second component outweighs the first,
and therefore the policy results in an overall increase of v˜c.
The regulation strictly increases social welfare. This can be seen by rewriting (2.1) in terms of
v˜c as show below:
W 1(rL,e) = α− α(1− v˜c(e,rL))(1+ρ)1+ v˜c(e,rL) − eC. (2.2)
The regulation increases welfare as it increases v˜c(e,rL), and therefore increases the expected
gain for the buyers and reduces the expected reputation loss while at the same time reducing the
cost of effort eC.
Costless Private Signal
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I consider here a rating agency that can find out the quality of the security at no cost: C = 0. In this
case, the agency always assigns the certificate to a high-quality security, while for a low-quality one
the decision depends on the reputation cost and the ex post fee.
Proposition 25. When C = 0, for ρ > β in equilibrium v˜c = 1, while for ρ ≤ β an interval of v˜c ≤ 1
can be sustained in equilibrium:v˜∗(x)≡
v˜c ∈

[ ρβ , v˜
∗(ρ)] if βVL ≤ ρ < β ,
[VL, v˜∗(ρ)] if ρ < βVL.
where v˜∗(ρ) := (2α−1+(αβ +1−α)x/β+
+
√
[1−2α− (αβ +1−α)x/β ]2−4x(α− (1−α)/β ))/2.
A high reputation cost (i.e., ρ > β ) induces the rating agency assign the certificate only if
θ = H. For a lower reputation cost, the low-quality security receives the certificate with positive
probability. A continuum of v˜c can be supported, and for a larger ρ more informative equilibria
survive, as ∂ v˜
∗(x)
∂x > 0.
As in equilibrium rH = 1 and wlg. e = 1, the ex ante total welfare is given by:
W 2(rL,c) = α− (1−α)(1+ρ)crL.
Where c is the probability that a certificate is issued for θ = L.
Effect of the Policy
The lemma below describes the effect of the policy.
Lemma 26. If an upper bound 0≤ φR < ρ is imposed, in equilibrium v˜c = 1.
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The cap directly affects the incentive to assign the certificate upon observing θ = L: the rating
agency will deny a certificate if and only if the ex post fee is smaller than the reputation cost.
Therefore, it is enough to impose a cap on the contingent fee that is low enough to ensure that only
high-quality securities are certified. The policy has the expected impact on total welfare; it increases
total welfare by preventing the sale of the low-quality security, and therefore ensures an ex ante total
welfare: W 2(rL,c) = α .
This result holds for any ρ > 0 and is in line with the results of Bolton et al. (2012) and
Kovbasyuk (2011).
2.5 Conclusion
A one-period model with a single rating agency is presented here. The agency is paid by the issuer
and has the incentive to certify only securities of high-quality. The rating agency also has the
incentive to exert effort to discover the quality of the security only to the extent that it needs to
maintain a reputation for honesty among uninformed buyers of the security. I then analyze the
effect of a regulation that requires payments from the issuer to the rating agency to be independent
of the agency’s choice to issue the certificate. In this model, I allow a more general policy of putting
a non-negative cap on the amount of contingent payments. I show that the cap that ensures the
highest informative content of the certification, or, in other words, minimizes the probability that a
low-quality product receives the certificate, is the lowest possible cap: the complete elimination of
contingent payments.
I also show that the policy has no effect when the cost of finding out the quality of the product is
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high, compared to the cost of losing reputation (C > (1−α)ρ). In that case, regardless of the policy,
in the unique equilibrium in which certification takes place, the certificate is assigned regardless of
the quality of the security and the policy does not reduce rating inflation.
When instead the cost of screening the product is relatively low (C ≤ (1−α)ρ), the policy has
an effect when the reputational incentive is also low. The policy increases the agency’s incentive
to obtain a precise signal of the security’s quality - for a given probability that the issuer of a low-
quality security requests the certificate. The policy also reduces the incentive of a low-quality issuer
to request the certificate. In equilibrium, eliminating contingent payments at the same time reduces
the probability that a low-quality product is brought to the rating agency and the agency’s effort.
Overall, the first effect has a stronger impact on the probability that a low-quality security gets the
certificate, and therefore, the policy reduces the inflation of ratings.
There are two dimensions along which the model could be further elaborated to get fruitful
insights. First, allowing competition in the market for certification would have the effect of changing
the profits of issuer and certifier(s) and, at the same time, affect the incentives of the certifier to exert
effort, as well as the incentive for the issuer to demand one or more certificates, depending on the
quality of her security. Second, introducing more types of securities could also prove interesting. It
could be interesting to consider the issuer’s participation decision, conditional on the quality of her
security, and the agency’s choice of screening, when there is a continuum of securities’ types.
Chapter 3
Social Learning Among Heterogeneous Consumers
3.1 Introduction
Information about the popularity of consumer products is more readily available than ever. Lists
of best-selling books and most viewed movies have provided consumers with information about
the purchasing choices of other consumers for decades. But in 2014, sites like Amazon provide
rankings of every product’s sales, and in almost any other market, from cars to college education,
data on consumers’ choices are easy to obtain. To the extent that other consumers’ decisions can be
observed, these decisions may convey valuable information about a product’s quality. If the sales of
a product can be observed by the entire market, how should firms price their products?
We model a market in which a monopolistic firm sells a product of unobservable binary quality
to a sequence of consumers with heterogeneous preferences. Our firm can set a new price every
time a consumer enters the market. Consumers have limited private information about the product’s
quality, but can observe the purchasing decisions of all their predecessors, as well as the history
of prices. For theoretical simplicity, we abstract from salient features of the markets described
above, and we assume that consumers also observe the preference types of their predecessors. In
this setting, each consumer’s action might affect the public belief about the quality of the product.
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When a consumer’s action reveals her private information, we say that social learning takes place.
Whenever there is sufficient uncertainty about the product’s quality, the firm gains, ex ante, from
social learning. The price of the product affects the probability of social learning. We provide
conditions under which the firm chooses a price higher or lower than the static optimal one in order
to increase the probability of social learning.
In a similar setting, Bose et al. (2006) and Bose et al. (2008) have studied the pricing strategy
of a monopolistic firm when consumers have identical preferences and only differ in their private
information. We extend their analysis to consider a market in which consumers have heterogeneous
preferences. While it is clear that consumers are heterogeneous, the need to consider explicitly
this heterogeneity should be justified. First of all, we show that the results in Bose et al. (2008),
discussed below, do not generalize to the case of heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, our setting
with heterogeneous consumers provides an example of a model of social learning in which rational
herds and informational cascades, two phenomena which have attracted a lot of attention in the
recent literature, do not take place. Finally, we provide a framework that can be extended to the case
of imperfect competition.
In Bose et al. (2008), a monopolist selling a product of unobservable, binary quality always
gains ex ante from social learning and the probability of social learning is maximized by a price
(weakly) higher than the static-profit-maximizing price. In our setting, the monopolist does not
necessarily gain from social learning. When consumers believe that the product quality is likely
to be high, the monopolist static profits are a concave function of the product’s reputation, and the
monopolist prefers to avoid any social learning. Moreover, high prices do not necessarily trigger
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social learning. Intermediate prices generate the largest probability of social learning. High prices
make most types of consumers unwilling to purchase, regardless of their private signal. Low prices,
instead, make many types of consumers willing to buy for any realization of their private signal.
Intermediate prices result in the largest set of consumer types that are willing to buy if and only if
they observe a private signal correlated with high quality.
Finally, for the set of parameters that we consider, in equilibrium each private signal is inferred
from the consumer’s action with positive probability. Informational cascades, that is, situations in
which consumers disregard their private signal and social learning comes to a complete halt, are
typical of models with binary signals and homogeneous consumers, but do not take place in our
setting. Our assumptions on the heterogeneity of preferences ensure that the monopolist firm never
sets a pooling price for which all consumers types, or none at all, buy the product. In equilibrium
there is always an interval of types that buy only if they observe a private signal correlated with high
quality.
The seminal papers in the literature on social learning, Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al.
(1992), have considered the process of social learning in the context of fixed prices.1 Bose et al.
(2006) is the first attempt to consider the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist in the context of
social learning.
The interaction between price dynamics and social learning has been considered before in [?].
The authors consider a financial market in which privately informed traders act sequentially and the
asset price adjusts to incorporate all public information available. If the uncertainty is unidimen-
1Chamley (2003) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on social learning.
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sional, the equilibrium price prevents informational cascades. In case of multiple dimensions of
uncertainty instead, there is the possibility of herding.
The results presented here are a preliminary step towards an analysis of the optimal pricing
strategies of competing firms that can influence the process of social learning with their prices.
Caminal and Vives (1996) have considered the question in a ”large” market in which every consumer
type is present and active in each period. Their paper gives an information-based explanation for
the focus of firms on market shares and they assume that the history of consumers’ decisions is
observable, but the history of prices is not.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the equilibria and presents some comparative statics. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Our model extends the framework used in Bose et al. (2008). In an infinitely repeated game, a
firm sells a product of quality Q ∈ {H,L} to a sequence of short-lived consumers. Q is determined
once and for all, at the beginning of the game. The good is equally likely to be of high or low
quality:
Pr(Q = H) = 1/2.
While this distribution is common knowledge, the actual quality is not known to anyone, in-
cluding the firm.2 At each period t ∈ {1,2, . . .}, the firm sets a price pt , a new consumer t arrives in
the market and observes a private signal st ∈ {h, l}, correlated with the product quality:
2Also in Bose et al. (2008) the firm ignores the quality of its product. This assumption rules out the possibility of
using the price as a signal of quality.
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Pr(st = h|Q = H) = Pr(st = l|Q = L) = α ∈ (12 ,1).
The consumer buys at most one unit of the good, and exits the market at the end of the period.
Let at ∈ {0,1} describe the action of the consumer: a1 = 1 if the consumer purchases the good,
at = 0 otherwise. The payoff of the consumer active in period t equals
UCt (at) = at(θt1H − pt),
where 1H = 1 if Q = H, and 1H = 0 otherwise and θt ∼U [0,1] is the consumer’s valuation of
the product. This valuation is public information, and is observed only once the consumer enters
the market. In particular, the parameter is observed after the firm sets its price. We assume ob-
servable preferences, as in our reference model (Bose et al. (2008)), in order to provide a clean
characterization of the new results due to the introduction of consumer heterogeneity.3
The firm has no cost to produce the good and its payoff is
UF({pt}t=1,2,..) =
+∞
∑
t=1
δ t−1uF(pt), where u f (pt) := at pt .
The discount factor satisfies δ ∈ [0,1). As in Bose et al. (2008), it is crucial that the action of
each consumer is observed by the consumers who subsequently enter the market. The sequence of
actions in period t is as follows:
1. The firm and consumer t observe the preference parameters of past consumers, their pur-
chasing decisions, as well as the history of prices. We denote the public history as ht :=
{ps,θs,as}s=1,..,t , with h1 = /0, and the set of all possible histories as Ht .
3As discussed in the conclusion, we left the model with unobservable preferences for future work.
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2. The firm sets a price pt : Ht → R+,
3. Consumer t observes the private signal st and takes an action at ∈ {0,1}.
Let λt denote the public belief about the probability that the quality is H at the beginning of
period t, that is λt = Pr(Q = G|ht), where λ1 is exogenous. We denote with φ(λt) the probability
that signal st = h is observed:
φ(λt) := Pr(st = H|λt) = λtα+(1−λt)(1−α).
The consumer’s private belief about quality is a function of the private signal and the public
belief, and is denoted as follows:
λ+t := Pr(Q = H|λt ,st = h) = αλtφ(λt) ,
λ−t := Pr(Q = H|λt ,st = l) = (1−α)λt1−φ(λt) .
We begin the next section with the PBE of a static setting. We then proceed to characterize the
equilibrium in a two period setting, and compare it with the case of homogeneous preferences. We
conclude with a few numerical examples of equilibria in the infinite period game.
3.3 The Equilibrium
We assume that, when indifferent, a consumer buys the product. Therefore consumer t purchases
if and only if
pt ≤ θtE(Q|λt ,st). (3.1)
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We first characterize the equilibrium in the single period setting.
3.3.1 Single Period Game
The next lemma characterizes the monopolist pricing strategy, and the corresponding probability
that the product is sold, in the single period game.4,5
Lemma 27. If λ < 3α−22α−1 (condition 1), the monopolist sets p(λ ) = p
∗(λ ) := λ+/2 and the product
is purchased only if the consumer’s preference parameter satisfies θ ≥ 1/2 and the consumer ob-
serves a private signal s= h. If condition 1 is not satisfied, then p(λ ) = p∗∗(λ ) : λ
+λ−
2(λ++φ(λ )(λ−−λ+)) .
At this price, the consumer purchases regardless of her private signal iff θ ≥ θL, and purchases
only if s = H in case θ ∈ [θH ,θL), where
θH := p
∗∗(λ )
λ+ , and θ
L := p
∗∗(λ )
λ− .
The monopolist either sets a high price p∗(λ ), and sells only in case the consumer has a high
valuation and she observes a favorable signal, or it sets a lower price p∗∗(λ )< p∗(λ ). For this price,
a consumer with high valuation buys regardless of her signal, and a consumer with intermediate
valuation buys only if s = h.
Depending on the precision of the private signal, the monopolist adopts one of two alternative
pricing regimes. If α < 2/3 (we will refer to this case as the imprecise signal regime), the private
signal is not very informative and therefore the consumer’s willingness to pay does not vary much
with her signal. In this setting, the monopolist sets p(λ ) = p∗∗(λ ) for any public belief λ ∈ [0,1].
Figure 3.1a shows the monopolist’s payoff from setting p∗(λ ) and p∗∗(λ ), while Figure 3.2a shows
how the optimal price - p∗∗(λ ) - depends on the public belief.
4In the single period game, we drop the time subscript.
5Lemma 27 resembles the first scenario described in Bose et al. (2008), section 4.2.
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If instead α > 2/3 (the precise signal regime), the consumer’s willingness to pay varies con-
siderably with her private signal. As a result, for a low public belief, the firm prefers to set
p(λ ) = p∗(λ ) and sell only if the consumer observes s = H, while for a high public belief, the
firm chooses p∗∗(λ ). Figures 3.1b and 3.2b describe, respectively, the value function and the opti-
mal price. In the precise signal regime, the price does not increase monotonically with the public
belief λ .
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Figure 3.1: Static value function as a function of public belief
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Figure 3.2: Static price as a function of public belief
In the next subsection, we take the first step towards characterizing the dynamic game: we
describe the process of social learning.
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3.3.2 The Process of Social Learning
In the dynamic version of the game, the public belief about the product’s quality evolves as a
result of the observed consumers’ decisions, their preferences and the prices. The public belief is
updated as follows
If λ−t < pt ≤ λ+t :
λt+1 =

λ+t if at = 1, and θt ∈ [ ptλ+t ,1],
λ−t if at = 0, and θt ∈ [ ptλ+t ,1],
λt otherwise,
If pt ≤ λ−t :
λt+1 =

λ+t if at = 1, and θt ∈ [ ptλ+t ,
pt
λ−t
],
λ−t if at = 0, and θt ∈ [ ptλ+t ,
pt
λ−t
],
λt otherwise.
Although we have not yet characterized the equilibrium in the two period setting, it is immedi-
ately clear that, in equilibrium, the consumer buys if and only if condition 3.1 is satisfied. We make
the innocuous assumption that an out-of-equilibrium action does not have any informative content.
As the consumer’s preference parameter is observable, the learning process is straightforward.
If the consumer is a type that purchases if and only if she observes st = h, then the private signal
can be inferred from her action. Otherwise, her action has no informative content. Therefore, the
probability that the market can infer the private signal corresponds to the probability that the con-
sumer makes her decision contingent on the signal observed. Figure 3.3 shows how the probability
to infer the private signal depends on the price set by the firm.
If pt < λ−t learning takes place if and only if θt ∈ [ ptλ− , ptλ+ ] and therefore a higher price results
in a higher probability that the signal can be inferred. If λ−t < pt ≤ λ+t , the private signal can be
inferred if and only if θt ∈ [ ptλ+t ,1]. A higher price results in a lower probability that the private
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Figure 3.3: Probability of social learning as a function of price, for α = 3/5
signal is inferred.
In the next subsection, we characterize the equilibrium pricing strategy in the two period game.
3.3.3 Two Period Game
In the two period setting, we do not limit δ to be smaller than 1. In the second period, the
monopolist faces the same incentives as in the static model described in subsection 3.1, and therefore
follows the pricing strategy described in Lemma 27.
Let v2(λ2) denote the monopolist’s expected payoff in the second period as a function of the
public belief, that is v2(λ ′2) := E(uF(p(λ2))|λ2 = λ ′2), where p(λ ) is defined in Lemma 27. More-
over, let Ev2(λ1) be the expected value of v2(λ2) if the firm and the second-period consumer can
infer the private signal observed in the first period
Ev2(λ1) := φ(λ1)v2(λ+1 )+(1−φ(λ1))v2(λ−1 ).
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Whenever Ev2(λ1)> v2(λ1), the monopolistic firm has an incentive to enhance social learning. The
next lemma characterizes how the incentive to generate social learning depends on the public belief.
Lemma 28. There exists two thresholds, λ¯ := max
{3α−2
4α−2 ,0
}
, and ¯¯λ ∈ (λ¯ ,1), such that:
1. If λ1 ≤ λ¯ or λ1 = ¯¯λ , the firm is indifferent, ex ante, to social learning: Ev2(λ1) = v2(λ1),
2. If λ1 ∈ (λ¯ , ¯¯λ ), the firm (strictly) prefers, ex ante, if social learning takes place: Ev2(λ1) >
v2(λ1),
3. If λ1 ∈ ( ¯¯λ ,1), the firm (strictly) prefers, ex ante, if social learning does not take place:
Ev2(λ1)< v2(λ1).
The interval [0, λ¯ ] is not empty if and only if α > 2/3. In this case, for a low initial reputation,
the firm anticipates to charge p∗(λ2) in the second period, whether or not social learning takes place.
For this pricing strategy, the revenues are a linear function of the public belief, and therefore the firm
is locally risk neutral. If instead the firm expects to charge p∗∗(λ2) then for low values of λ2 the
firm revenues are a convex function of the public belief, while for high enough λ1, the revenues are
concave.
In the first period, the monopolist follows one of two pricing strategies, depending on the preci-
sion of the private signal. The next subsections describe these strategies.
Case I. Imprecise signal regime.
We first characterize the equilibrium for α < 2/3. In the first period, the monopolist chooses
the price that maximizes the discounted sum of current and future payoffs. The next lemma defines
the pricing strategy in the first period.
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Lemma 29. Let α < 2/3. Define p∗∗1 (λ ) as:
p∗∗1 (λ ) := p
∗∗(λ )(1+δ (
1
λ−
− 1
λ+
)(Ev∗∗2 (λ )− v∗∗2 (λ )) (3.2)
where v∗∗(λ ′) := E(uF(p∗∗(λ ))|λ = λ ′). In the first period, the monopolist charges
p1(λ1) :=

p∗∗1 (λ1) if p∗∗1 (λ1) ∈ [0,λ−1 ]
0 if p∗∗1 (λ1)< 0
λ−1 if p
∗∗
1 (λ1)> λ
−
1
α < 2/3 implies λ¯ = 0, and therefore for any public belief λ1 < ¯¯λ , the monopolist gains - in
expectation - if social learning takes place. If instead λ1 > ¯¯λ , the monopolist is better off if less
social learning takes place. Figure 3.4 shows the optimal price in the first period, as well as the
static optimal price. For λ1 < λ¯ , in the first period, the monopolist sets a price larger that the static
optimal price: p1(λ1) > p∗∗(λ ), while for λ1 > λ¯1, the price in the first period is smaller then the
static optimal price p1(λ1) < p∗∗(λ1). In case of δ large enough, Figure 3.4 shows that for low
values of the public belief λ1 the monopolist charges the price that ensures the largest possible
probability of social learning: p1 = λ−1 .
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Figure 3.4: Pricing strategy in the first period - imprecise signal (α = .65, δ = 100)
Case II. Precise signal.
We characterize here the equilibrium for α > 2/3. In the second period the monopolist sets
p2(λ2) = p∗(λ2) if λ2 < (3α − 2)/(2α − 1), and p2(λ2) = p∗∗(λ2) otherwise. The next lemma
characterizes the choice of price in the first period.
Lemma 30. Let α > 2/3, then, in the first period, the price satisfies:
1. If λ1 ≤ 3α−24α−2 , then p1(λ1) = p∗(λ1).
2. If λ1 ∈ (3α−24α−2 , 3α−22α−1 ], then
p1(λ1) :=

p∗1(λ1) if p∗1(λ1) ∈ [λ−1 ,λ+1 ]
λ−1 if p
∗
1(λ1)< λ
−
1
λ+1 if p
∗
1(λ1)> λ
+
1
Where p∗1(λ1) := p∗(λ1)+
δ
2φ(λ1)(v2(λ1)−Ev2(λ1)).
3. If, instead, λ1 > 3α−22α−1 , then
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p1(λ1) :=

p∗∗1 (λ1) if p∗∗1 (λ1) ∈ [0,λ−1 ]
0 if p∗∗1 (λ1)< 0
λ−1 if p
∗∗
1 (λ1)> λ
−
1
Moreover if 3α−22α−1 < λ1 <
¯¯λ , then p1(λ1)> p∗∗(λ ), while for λ1 > λ¯ then p1(λ1)< p∗∗(λ ).
Figure 3.5 represents the optimal price in the first period, as well as the optimal static price. For
low values of the public belief, the monopolist is indifferent to the possibility of generating social
learning. Therefore, in the first period, the price equals the static optimal price. For intermediate
values of λ - that is λ ∈ [3α−24α−2 , ¯¯λ ] - the monopolist strictly prefers to generate social learning. To
generate social learning, it sets a price p1 that is lower that the static optimal price for low values
of the public belief (λ1 ∈ [3α−24α−2 , 3α−22α−1 ]) and a price higher than the static optimal price for larger
values of the public belief (λ1 ∈ [3α−22α−1 , ¯¯λ ]). For even larger values of the prior belief, the monopolist
prefers if social learning does not take place, and therefore sets a price lower than the static optimal
one.
The pricing strategy of the monopolist can be explained with the relation between price and
probability of social learning. The probability of social learning increases as the price moves closer
to λ−t . Whenever the monopolist prefers a larger probability of social learning, it sets a price higher
than the static optimal price p(λ ), if the latter is smaller than λ−t , but it sets a price lower that the
static optimal price if p(λ )> λ−t .
In the next subsection, we characterize the pricing strategy in a market in which consumers have
identical preferences.
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Figure 3.5: Pricing strategy in period 1 - precise signal (α = .75, δ = 200)
3.3.4 Homogeneous Preferences
In this section we assume θt = 1 in every period. The next lemma characterizes the equilibrium
price in the single period setting.6
Lemma 31. Let θ = 1. In the single period setting, if λ < α+α
2−1
2α2−α (condition 2), the monopolist
sets p(λ ) = λ+ and the product is purchased only if the consumer observes s = H. If condition 2 is
not satisfied, then p(λ ) = λ−. At this price, the consumer buys regardless of the signal.
As in the case of heterogeneous preferences, there are two potential optimal prices. Price p(λ )=
λ− can be called the pooling price: at this price the consumer buys regardless of the private signals.
Price p(λ ) = λ+ is instead a separating price: the consumers buys only if she observes signal s= h.
If the signal is imprecise (α <
√
5−1
2 ), the pooling price p(λ ) = λ
− maximizes the revenues. For a
precise signal, the separating price is optimal for low priors that satisfy condition 2. If the reputation
does not satisfy condition 2, then the firm chooses the pooling price.
6Lemma 31 is a two-period version to the first scenario described in Bose et al. (2008), section 4.2.
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We consider now the two period setting. The social learning process is straightforward: if
p1 ∈ [0,λ−1 ], then in the first period the consumer buys regardless of the signal observed and her
private information cannot be inferred. If instead p1 ∈ (λ−1 ,λ+1 ] the consumer buys only if the signal
is s1 = h, and therefore her signal can be perfectly inferred. As discussed in the introduction, in case
of homogeneous preferences, a higher price generates more information for future consumers.
In the second period, the firm adopts the optimal static pricing strategy. The next two lemmas
characterize the optimal pricing strategy in the first period, for different precisions of the private
signal.
Lemma 32. Let θ = 1 and α ≤
√
5−1
2 . Then in the first of two periods the firm sets:
p1(λ ) =

λ− if δ < δ¯ (α,λ )
λ+ if δ ≥ δ¯ (α,λ )
.
Where δ¯ (α,λ ) := (α
2+λ−2αλ )(1−α(1+λ )+α2(−1+2λ ))
((−1+2α)3(−1+λ )2λ ) .
If the signal is uninformative, the firm anticipates setting the pooling price in the second pe-
riod. Whenever the firm sets the pooling price, its payoff is a convex function of the public belief.
Therefore, the firm gains, in expectation, if social learning takes place. As a result, for a discount
factor large enough, the firm will set the separating price. The next lemma characterizes the pricing
strategy for the case of informative signal.
Lemma 33. Let θ = 1 and α ≥
√
5−1
2 . Then in the first of two periods the firm sets:
• p1(λ1) = λ+1 if λ1 ≤ α+α
2−1
2α2−α
• otherwise: p1(λ1) =

λ−1 if δ <
¯¯δ (α,λ1)
λ+1 if δ ≥ ¯¯δ (α,λ1)
.
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Where ¯¯δ (α,λ ) := −1+α(1+α+λ−2αλ )(2α−1)(λ−1) .
Similarly to the case of heterogeneous consumers, for informative private signals and low repu-
tation the monopolist is indifferent to social learning and therefore sets the static optimal price. For
higher values of the public belief, the firm sets the separating price if the discount factor is large
enough.
In the setting with homogeneous consumers the firm is either indifferent to social learning or
strictly prefers if social learning takes place, and social learning takes place if the firm sets the high
separating price. It should be noted that in the infinite game considered in Bose et al. (2008) the
firm strictly prefers if social learning takes place for any value of the parameters.
In the next subsection we discuss a few numerical examples of the equilibrium in the infinite
horizon setting.
3.3.5 Infinite Horizon Game
To characterize the pricing strategy in the infinite period setting, we define the value function
V (λt) as the discounted sum of present and expected future payoffs: V (λt) =E(∑+∞i=t u
F(pei )), where
pet is the equilibrium price in period t. In each period, the monopolist chooses a price that belongs
to one of two intervals: either pt ∈ [λ−t ,λ+t ] or pt ∈ [0,λ−t ]. We define a different value function for
each case.
Case 1 (λ−t < p≤ λ+t ). Let the value function for this case be denoted by V ∗(λt).
V1(λt) = max
λ−≤p≤λ+
{φ(λt)p(1− pλ+t
)+δ [
p
λ+t
(V (λt)−EV (λt))}
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Where EV (λ ) := φ(λ )V (λ+)+(1−φ(λ ))V (λ−). The optimal price in this case is
p2(λt) :=

p¯∗(λt) if p¯∗(λt) ∈ [λ−t ,λ+t ]
λ−t if p¯∗(λt)< λ−t
λ+t if p¯∗(λt)> λ+t
where:
p¯∗(λt) = p∗(λt)+
δφ(λt)
2
(V (λt)−EV (λt))
Hence, if V (λt) is convex in the interval [λ−,λ+], then λ− ≤ p¯∗(λt)≤ p∗(λt). And if V (λt) is
concave, p∗(λt)≤ p¯∗(λt)≤ λ+t .
Case 2 (p≤ λ−t ). Let the value function for this case be denoted by V ∗∗(λt).
V2(λt) = max
0≤p≤λ−t
{p(1− ( 1
λ−t
+φ(λt)(
1
λ−t
− 1
λ+t
))p)+δ (
p
λ−t
− p
λ+t
)(EV (λt)−V (λt))}
The optimal price in this case is
p2(λt) :=

p¯∗∗(λt) if p¯∗∗(λt) ∈ [0,λ−t ]
λ−t if p¯∗(λt)> λ−t
0 if p¯∗(λt)< 0
where:
p¯∗∗(λt) = p∗∗(λt)(1+
δ
2
(
1
λ−t
− 1
λ+t
)(EV (λt)−V (λt))
Hence, if V (λt) is concave in the interval [λ−,λ+], p¯∗∗(λt) ≤ p∗∗(λt). And if V (λt) is convex,
p∗∗(λt)≤ p¯∗∗(λt)< λ−.
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Given these two cases, now we can get the general value function:
V (λt) = max{V1(λt),V2(λt)}
If V1(λt) > V2(λt), the monopolist charges p1(λt). If V1(λt) < V2(λt), the monopolist charges
p2(λt). And if V1(λt) = V2(λt), the firm is indifferent between the two prices. We provide a few
numerical examples of value functions.
Value Function Iteration
(a) δ = 0.2, α = 0.6 (b) δ = 0.2, α = 0.8
(c) δ = 0.8, α = 0.6 (d) δ = 0.8, α = 0.8
Figure 3.6: Iterated Value Functions
We consider four different sets of parameter values and in each of the cases compare the iterated
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values of V1 and V2. The value function is the maximum of V1 and V2 for each value of λ . These
cases are shown in Figure 3.6.
When the private signals are imprecise (α = 0.6 in our examples), it is profitable to charge
p¯∗∗ for a large interval of values of λ . This is the case because the price p¯∗ ensures lower current
revenues than¯¯p∗ but higher expected future revenues (as the future consumers learn faster about the
quality of the product). Imprecise private signals, however, limit the scope of social learning.
As the monopolist becomes more patient (δ is higher), the difference between V1(λt) and V2(λt)
becomes smaller for intermediate value of λt . A high value of δ means a higher weight on future
payoffs. So the potential optimal prices p¯∗ and p¯∗∗ move closer to λ−t , which is the price that
ensures the largest probability of social learning.
3.4 Conclusion
We consider the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist that faces consumers with heteroge-
neous preferences. Consumers can observe the purchasing decisions and the preferences of previous
consumers, as well as the prices posted in the past by the firm. Our paper belongs to a subset of the
literature on social learning that considers how firms strategically adjust the price of their product
to influence the process of social learning.
We fully characterize the equilibrium in a two period setting and we present numerical examples
for the infinite period setting. Heterogeneous preferences ensure that information cascades do not
take place and the private signal observed by a consumer is inferred in equilibrium with a positive
probability. Our equilibrium differs from the case of homogeneous consumers in two important
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respects. First, the monopolist does not always gain from social learning. If consumers believe the
product to be of high quality with a large enough probability, the monopolist loses in expectation
from generating social learning. Moreover, higher prices do not correspond necessarily to a larger
probability of social learning. In our setting, intermediate prices generate the largest probability of
social learning. The firm might choose a price higher or lower than the static optimal price, depend-
ing on the initial public belief and the quality of the private signal observed by each consumer.
The next step in our research is to fully characterize the infinite period model. The infinite
period setting would allow an easier comparison with the previous literature. We are also interested
in describing the process of social learning in a setting where the preferences of previous consumers
cannot be observed. Observable preference types simplify the process of social learning, while at
the same time keeping the crucial feature due to the heterogeneity in preferences: the process of
social learning depends on the size of the interval of types that decide their purchase based on the
signal observed. At the same time, however, the assumption of observable preference types seems
quite unrealistic, especially in the infinite period setting
On a longer horizon, we plan to use our framework to characterize the equilibrium in a market
with social learning and competition between two firms. Our setting with heterogeneous preferences
could be easily adapted to consider a setting of competition between firms selling horizontally dif-
ferentiated products.
Appendix
Appendix to Chapter 1
A) Low-Bribes Equilibrium
I first consider the single-period game for a given H. I focus on equilibria in which the rating
agencies request identical bribes β It ,β IIt : β It + β IIt = p(g,g|Mt ,H). The price of the security is
defined by Lemma 5. If the issuer hires the two agencies, she ensures an expected payoff equal to
U I = (e∗t +(1− e∗t )(pi2+(1/2)pi(1−pi)Σi(1−µ it )(1−hi)))p(g,g|Mt ,H)− c(e∗t )−φ It −φ IIt .
(3.3)
The optimal effort choice maximizes the issuer’s expected payoff
e∗t (Φt) = e((1−pi)(1+pi− (pi/2)Σi(1−µ it )(1−hi))p(g,g|Mt ,H)). (3.4)
Assumption 1 ensures that an equilibrium with positive effort exists for any H ∈ [0,1)2. In
equilibrium, the rating agencies extract all the surplus generated by the issuer’s effort, as described
in the next lemma.
Lemma 34. An equilibrium with positive effort exists for any H ∈ [0,1)2. In equilibrium, the rating
agencies require the highest fee that the issuer is willing to pay
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φ It = φ
II
t = (1/2)(e
∗+(1− e∗)(pi2+(pi(1−pi)/2)Σi(1−µ it )(1−hi)))p(g,g|Mt ,H)− c(e∗)).
B) Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that all buyers hold identical beliefs on and out-of
the equilibrium path. Therefore, in any PBE:
|it : bidit = Pr{qt = G|rt ,µt ,h,φMt }| ≥ 2 ∀rt ,µt ,h,φMt , and
bidit ≤ Pr{qt = G|rt ,µt ,h,φMt } ∀i,rt ,µt ,h,φMt .
By construction, Pr{qt = B|rMt = b}= 1 therefore p(b,φt |µt ,h) = 0, ∀φt ,µt . p(g,φt |µ,h) is defined
by Bayes Rule, and as p(g,φt |µt ,h)≥ p(b,φt |µt ,h) the rate is hidden only if rt = b or if rt = g and
p(g,φt |µt ,h) = 0. Moreover, if the agency is not hired, then e∗t = 0; therefore p( /0,φt |µt ,h) = 0
∀φt ,µt
Proof of Lemma 2. (1.1), (1.3) hold at the same time iff p(g|µt ,h) = f (e((1− pi)p(g|µt ,h))),
where f (x) := x/(x+ (1− x)a), and a := pi + (1− pi)(1− µt)(1− h). As a ∈ (0,1) and e((1−
pi)p(g|µt ,h)) ∈ [0,1), then f ′′(x)< 0 (i). Moreover, c′′′ ≥ 0 and c′′ > 0 imply
∂ 2e((1−pi)p)/∂ p2 =−c′′′(e((1−pi)p))(1−pi)2/(c′′(e((1−pi)p)))3 ≤ 0 (3.5)
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(i) and (3.5) imply
∂ f (e((1−pi)p(g|.)))/∂ p(g|.)> 0 > ∂ 2 f (e((1−pi)p(g|.)))/∂ 2 p(g|.) (3.6)
(3.6) implies |{x : x = f (e((1−pi)x))}| ≤ 2. 0 = f (e((1−pi)0)) implies that p(g|µt ,h) = e∗ = 0
satisfy (1.1) and (1.3) and that there is at most a unique pair p(g|µt ,h)> 0 and e∗ > 0 that satisfies
(1.1) and (1.3). As f (e((1−pi)1)) ≤ 1, then a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a unique x ∈ (0,1) s.t. x = f (e((1−pi)x)) is
∂ f (e((1−pi)x))/∂x|x=0 > 1 (3.7)
If (3.7) does not hold, then x > f (e((1−pi)x))∀x ∈ (0,1). (3.7) holds for all h ∈ [0,1] iff
µt > 1/(1−pi)−1/c′′(0)
Let
φ t := (e
∗
t +(1− e∗t )pi)p(g|µt ,h)− c(e∗t ).
I rule out pathological equilibria in which some type of rating agency requests φ ∗t > φ t . In any
equilibrium in which µ(φt) = µt ∀µt , both types of agency set φ ∗t = φ t . If instead in equilibrium
µ(φ ′t ) 6= µt for some φ ′t , by Assumption 2, φ ′t must be on the equilibrium path for some type of
agency. But this implies that there is at least another φ ′′t on the equilibrium path s.t. µ(φ ′t ) 6= µ(φ ′′t ).
WLG let µ(φ ′t ) > µ(φ ′′t ) (i). If the honest type strictly prefers φ ′′t over φ ′t , then µ(φ ′t ) = 0, which
contradicts (i). If the honest type is indifferent or strictly prefers φ ′t over φ ′′t then the strategic type
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strictly prefers φ ′t over φ ′′t because β (µ(φ ′t ),h)> β (µ(φ ′′t ),h), which implies that either µ(φ ′′t ) = 1
(which contradicts (i)) or φ ′′t is out of the equilibrium path, which is also a contradiction 
Proof of Proposition 4. First of all h∗2 = 0. In the last period a strategic agency has no incentive
to maintain a reputation for honesty. To characterize the equilibrium, I need to pin down h∗1and to
show that it is optimal for the rating agency - regardless of its type - to set a fee in each period s.t.
the issuer is willing to hire the agency. For the moment, I assume that the latter condition is satisfied
and I pin down hM∗1 . For s1 = b, an honest rate ensures a continuation payoff δuMs2 (µ
b(h∗1)). If
instead a bribe is paid, the continuation payoff is p(g|µ1,h∗1)+δuMs2 (µg(h∗1)).
Step 1.p(g|µt ,h∗t ) satisfies the implicit function
F(p(g|.),µt ,h∗t ) := p(g|.)− f (e((1−pi)p(g|.))) = 0
where f (.) is defined in the Proof of 2. As shown in Lemma 2,
Fp(p∗(g|µt ,h∗t ),µt ,h∗t )|p > 0 ∀µt ,h∗t .
Moreover, the Implicit Function Theorem ensures that
∂ p(g|µt ,h∗t )/∂µt =−Fµ(p(g|.),µt)/Fp(p(g|.),µt)> 0.
Step 2. Note that
∂ (p(g|µ1,h∗1)/∂h∗1 > 0 (i), ∂µg(h∗1)/∂h∗1 > 0 (ii)
∂us2(µ2)/∂µ2 = (∂ p(g|µ2,0)/∂µ2)(1− (1−pi)p(g|µ2,0)∂e((1−pi)x)/∂x|x=p(g|µ2,0))> 0 (iii)
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(iii) holds as ∂ p(g|µ2,0)∂µ2 > 0 by Step 1 and
p(g|.)∂e((1−pi)x)/∂x|x=p(g|.) < e((1−pi)p(g|.)) (iv)
e((1−pi)p(g|.)) < 1. (iv) in turn, holds as ∂ 2e((1−pi)x)/∂x2 < 0 and e(0) = 0. (i), (ii), and (iii)
imply
∂ (p(g|µ1,h∗1)+δuM2 (µg(h∗1))/∂h∗1 > 0.
Step 3. ∂us2(µ
b(h∗1)))/∂h∗1 < 0: as ∂µb(h∗1)/∂h∗1 < 0 and ∂uM2 (µ2)/∂µ2 > 0 by in step 2.
Step 4. From steps 2 and 3, either:
p(g|µ1,h1)+δuM2 (µb(h1))> δuM2 (µb(h1)), ∀h1 ∈ [0,1)
in which case the agency strictly prefers to request a bribe and hM∗1 = 0, or there is a unique h
M∗ ∈
[0,1] s.t.
p(g|µ1,hM∗) = δ (us2(µb(hM∗))−us2(µb(hM∗)))
in which case hM1 = h
M∗. Let δ
M
be defined by
p(g|µ1,0)+δMuM2 (µg(0)) = δ
M
uM2 (µ
b(0)).
As uM2 (µg(0))< uM2 (µb(0)), for δ < δ
M
hM1 = 0, while for δ ≥ δ
M
hM1 = h
M∗ holds.
Step 5. All is left to show is that is it optimal to set a fee s.t. the issuer is willing to hire the
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agency. In the last period, Lemma 3 ensures that the agency - regardless of its type - will set a
fee equal to the highest willingness to pay of the issuer. In the first period, assume that each type
sets a fee s.t. it is not optimal to hire an agency; then the payoff of a honest type equals uC2 (µ1) =
(e∗+(1− e∗)pi)p(g|µ1,0)− c(e∗). By deviating to φ 1 := (e∗t +(1− e∗t )pi)p(g|µt ,h∗1)− c(e∗t ), the
strategic type has a profitable deviation. In fact φ 1 > 0 and E(uC2 (µ1)|) > µ1(i). (i) is the case
because
a)E(µ2) = e∗µ1+(1− e∗)piµb(hM∗)+(1− e∗)(1−pi)µg(hM∗)>
> e∗µ1+(1− e∗)(pi+(1−pi)(1−µb1 )(1−h∗1))µ(hM∗)+
+((1− e∗)(1−pi)(1−µ1(1−hM∗1 ))µg1 (hM∗)> µ1.
b) Define
uC2 (µ2) := (e
∗
2(µ1)+(1− e∗2(µ1))pi)p(g|µ1,0)− c(e∗2(µ1)),
then ∂ 2uC2 (µ2)/∂µ2 > 0. But u
C
2 (µ2)≥ uC2 (µ2) and ∂ (uC2 (µ2)−uC2 (µ2))/∂µ2 < 0 iff µ2 < µ1,
therefore ∂ 2uC2 (µ2)/∂µ
2
2 |µ2=µ1 > 0.
As in the first period fees s.t the issuer is not willing to hire the agency can be ruled out, Lemma 3
ensures that the agency - regardless of its type - will set a fee equal to the issuer’s highest willingness
to pay 
Proof of Corollary 1. Let F(h∗1,δ ) := δ− p(g|µ1,h∗1)/(uMs2 (µb(h∗1))−uMs2 (µg(h∗1))). By the Implicit
Fun. Theorem:
∂h∗1/∂δ =− ∂F(h
∗
1,δ )/∂δ
∂F(h∗1,δ )/∂h
∗
1
and ∂F(h∗1,δ )/∂δ > 0 while
∂F(h∗1,δ )/∂h∗1 =− (d p(g|µ1,h
∗
1)/dh
∗
1)(u
Ms
2 (µ
b(h∗1))−uMs2 (µg(h∗1)))−p(g|µ1,h∗1)((duMs2 (µb(h∗1))/dµb(h∗1))(dµb(h∗1)/dh∗1)+..
(uMs2 (µb(h
∗
1))−uMs2 (µg(h∗1)))2
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−(du2(µg(h∗1))/dµg(h∗1))(dµg(h∗1)/dh∗1))
. < 0
The last inequality holds as: ∂ p(g|µ1,h∗1)/∂h > 0, duMs2 /dµ2 > 0, and ∂µg(h∗1)/∂h∗1 > 0
> ∂µb(h∗1)/∂h∗1.
To show lim
δ→∞
h∗1 it is enough to show that u
Ms
2 (µ
b(h∗1))− uMs2 (µg(h∗1)) = 0 iff h∗1 = 1. The if part
holds as µb(1) = µg(1) the only if part holds as: h∗1 < 1→ µb(h∗1) > µg(h∗1) and as shown above
∂uMs2 /∂µ2 > 0. Finally, ∂δ
M
/dµ1 > 0 as ∂ p(g|µ1,0)/∂µ1 > 0 and
∂ (uMs2 (µ
b(0))−uMs2 (µg(0)))/∂µ1 = ∂ (1−uMs2 (µg(0)))/∂µ1 < 0 
Proof of Lemma 5. In equilibrium, suppose that following fees Φt the issuer is expected to hire only
one agency and e∗(Φt)> 0. Then by Assumption 3 e∗(Φt)> 0 and p(g,Φt |.)> 0 must be mutually
consistent as in monopoly. Assumption 3 requires that also p(g,g,Φt |.) must also be mutually
consistent with the effort choice. Suppose p(g,g,Φt |.)≤ p(g,Φt |): then the effort choice is identical
whether the agency hires one or two agencies. But for identical effort, it must be the case that
p(g,g,Φt |.)> p(g,Φt |) as µ It ,µ IIt > 0. Therefore, it must be the case that p(g,g,Φt |.)> p(g,Φt |).
Suppose there is an equilibrium in which the issuer hires only one agency. Then either the fees φ It
and φ IIt are such that the issuer is indifferent to hire either of the agencies and φ It > 0 and φ IIt > 0,
in which case every agency has an incentive to charge an ε- smaller fee, or φ It ≥ 0 and φ IIt ≥ 0 with
at least one weak inequality holding as an equality; then any agency charging φ it = 0 could deviate
to a strictly positive, small enough fee and ensure a larger profit. If in equilibrium the issuer does
not hire the agencies, he exerts no effort, p(rt |µ,h) = 0∀rt and the Lemma holds. If in equilibrium
the issuer hires the two agencies, if p(Rt |Mt ,Ht)> 0 for rit = /0 for some i ∈ {I, II}, then the issuer
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hides an unfavorable rating, making p(Rt |Mt ,Ht)> 0 not consistent with the equilibrium strategies.
p(Rt |Mt ,Ht) = 0 if rit = b for some i ∈ {I, II} by construction. p(g,g|Mt ,Het ) is defined by Bayes
Rule 
Proof of Lemma 6. If β−i∗t ≥ p(g,g,Φ|.), then β it is paid only if β it ≤ p(g,g,Φ|) and s−i = g. So
β it = p(g,g,Φ|.) maximizes Ai’s expected payoff. If instead β−it < p(g,g,Φ|.), the payoff of Ai is
maximized by:
β it =

p(g,g,Φ|.)−β−it if (pi+(1−pi)(1−µ−it )(1−h−i))(p(g,g,Φ|.)−β−it )≥ pi p(g,g,Φ|.),
p(g,g,Φ|.) otherwise.
So, in equilibrium either β I∗t = β II∗t = p(g,g,Φ|.) or β it +β jt = p(g,g,Φ|.) 
Proof of Lemma 7. (1.6) and (1.8) hold at the same time iff
p(g,g|Mt ,H) = f H(e((1−pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H))),
where f H(x) := x/(x+(1−x)aH), and aH := pi2+ ∑
I,II
(1−pi)pi(1−µ it )(1−hi). Applying the same
steps followed in Lemma 2, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an x ∈ (0,1) :
x = f H(e((1−pi2)x)) is: ∂ f H(e((1−pi2)x))/∂x|x=0 > 1 (i). (i) holds for every H ∈ [0,1]2 iff
e′(0)(1−pi2)/(pi2+pi(1−pi)(2− (µ It +µ IIt )))> 1
which is equivalent to↔ µ It +µ IIt > (2−pi)/(1−pi)− (1+pi)/pic′′(0) 
Proof of Lemma 8. Let φ t :=(e∗t +(1− e∗t )pi) p(g,g|Mt ,H)−c(e∗t ). I rule out pathological equilibria
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in which some type of rating agency requests φ ∗t > φ t . In any equilibrium in which µ(φt) = µt∀µt
Assumption 5 ensures that both types of agency set φ ∗t = φ t/2. If instead in equilibrium µ i(φ ′t ) 6= µ it
for some φ ′t , by Assumption 2 φ ′t must be on the equilibrium path for some type of agency Ai. But
this implies that there exists at least another φ ′′t on the equilibrium path s.t. µ i(φ ′t ) 6= µ i(φ ′′t ). WLG
let µ I(φ ′t ) > µ I(φ ′′t ) (i). If the honest type strictly prefers φ ′′t over φ ′t , then µ i(φ ′t ) = 0, which
contradicts (i). If the honest type is indifferent or strictly prefers φ ′t over φ ′′t , then the strategic
type strictly prefers φ ′t over φ ′′t because β (M(φ ′t ),H) > β (M(φ ′′t ),H) which implies that either
µ i(φ ′′t ) = 1 (contradicting (i)) or φ ′′t is out of the equilibrium path which is also a contradiction 
Proof of Lemma 9. Using the definitions in the proofs of Lemma 7 and Lemma 24
aH < aL→ f H(e((1−pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H)))> f L(e((1−pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H))), ∀M ∈ (0,1)2,H ∈ [0,1)2,
(i) Moreover:
f L(e((1−pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H)))> f L(e((1−pi)(1+pi−(pi/2)ΣI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi)p(g,g|Mt ,H)))∀M ∈
(0,1)2, H ∈ [0,1)2. (ii)
Therefore, if pH > 0 and pL > 0 and pH = f H(e((1−pi2)pH)) while
pL = f L(e((1−pi)(1+pi− (pi/2)ΣI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi)pL)),
then pH > pL. Therefore, the equilibrium price following two favorable ratings is larger if the
agencies coordinate on high bribes. Also, the equilibrium effort is larger if agencies coordinate on
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high bribes, as
e((1−pi2)p)> e((1−pi)(1+pi− (pi/2)ΣI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi)p) ∀p 
Proof of Proposition 10. First of all hI∗2 = h
II∗
2 = 0. In the last period a strategic agency has no
incentive to maintain a reputation for honesty. To characterize the equilibrium, I need to pin down
hI∗1 ,h
II∗
1 and to show that it is optimal for the rating agency - regardless of its type - to set a fee
in each period s.t. the issuer is willing to hire the agency. For the moment, I assume that the
latter condition is satisfied and I pin down hi∗1 . In equilibrium, β
i
1 is paid only if s
−i
1 = g, in which
case a strategic agency faces a trade-off between demanding a bribe and obtaining p(g,g|M1,H∗1 )+
δuis2 (µ
i,g(H∗1 ),µ j,g(H∗1 )) and rating honestly to obtain δuis2 (µ
i,b(hi∗1 ),µ1).
Step 1. p(g,g|Mt ,H∗t ) ∈C1 is increasing in µ it , and hi∗t ∀i (analogous to Proof of Prop. 4).
Step 2. ∂ (p(g,g|M1,H∗1 )+δuis2 (µ i,g(H∗1 ),µ−i,g(H∗1 )))/∂hi1 > 0. This is the case as ∂µ i,g(H∗1 )/∂hi1
> 0, and
∂ui2(M2,0,0)/∂µ
i
2 =
= (∂ p(g,g|M2,0,0)/∂µ i2)∂ ((1/2)((e2+(1− e2)pi(2−pi))p(g,g|.)− c(e2)))/∂ p(g,g|.) =
= (1/2)(∂ p(g,g|M2,0,0)/∂µ i2)×
×((e2+(1− e2)pi(2−pi)−∂e((1−pi2)x)/∂x|x=p(g,g|M2,0,0)p(g,g|.)))> 0.
The inequality holds as ∂ p(g,g|M2,0,0)/∂µ i2 > 0 (step 1), and by the Proof of Prop. 4 for x =
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p(g,g|M2,0,0)}:
∂ (e(1−pi2)x)/∂x < e((1−pi2)x).
Step 3. ∂ui2(µ
i,b
2 (h
i∗
1 ),µ1)/∂h
i
1+∂u
i
2(µ
i,b
2 (h
i∗
1 ),µ1)/∂h
−i
1 = ∂u
i
2(µ
i,b
2 (h
i∗
1 ),µ1)/∂h
i
1 < 0.
This is the case as ∂µ i,b(hi∗1 )/∂h
∗
1 < 0.
Step 4. From steps 2 and 3, in the first period the two agencies will choose the same h∗1. Suppose
not and hI∗1 > h
II∗
1 (i), then h
I∗
1 > 0 implies
p(g,g|M1,H∗1 )+δuIs2 (µ I,g(H∗1 ),µ II,g(H∗1 )) = δuI2(µ I,b2 (hI∗1 ))
but then (i) implies: uI2(µ
I,b
2 (h
I∗
1 ))< u
II
2 (µ
II,b
2 (h
II∗
1 )) and therefore
δuII2 (µ
II,b
2 (h
II∗
1 ))> p(g,g|M1,H∗1 )+δuIs2 (µ I,g(H∗1 ),µ II,g(H∗1 )) =
= p(g,g|M1,H∗1 )+δuIIs2 (µ I,g(H∗1 ),µ II,g(H∗1 ))
Therefore, either
p(g,g|M1,H1)+δuis2 (µ i,g(H1),µ−i,g(H1))> δui2(µ i,b2 (hi1)) ∀hi1 ∈ [0,1),
in which case each agency strictly prefers to request a bribe and hI∗1 = h
II∗
1 = 0, or there is a unique
value h1(δ ) s.t.
p(g,g|M1,H1)+δuis2 (µ i,g(H1),µ−i,g(H1)) = δui2(µ i,b2 (hi1)),
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for hI1 = h
II
1 = h
c(δ ). Let δ
c
be defined by
p(g,g|M1, [0,0])+δ cuis2 (µ i,g(0,0),µ−i,g(0,0)) = δ
c
ui2(µ
i,b
2 (0)).
For δ < δ
c
hi1 = 0, while for δ ≥ δ
c
hI∗1 = h
II∗
t = h
c(δ ).
Step 5. All is left to show is that is it optimal to set a fee s.t. the issuer is willing to hire the
agency. In the last period, Lemma 8 ensures that the agency - regardless of its type - will set
a fee equal to the highest willingness to pay of the issuer. I rule out equilibria in which both
agencies set a rating fee higher than the fee defined in Lemma 8. In the first period, assume that
each type of agency Ai sets a fee s.t. it is not optimal to hire an agency: then the payoff of an
honest agency equals uC2 (µ1) = (e
∗+(1− e∗)pi)p(g,g|M1, [0,0])− c(e∗). By deviating to φ 1 :=
(1/2)((e∗t +(1−e∗t )pi)p(g,g|M1,H∗1 )−c(e∗t )) the strategic type has a profitable deviation (the proof
is identical to the proof of Proposition 4, step 5) 
Proof of Corollary 2. Let
F(hc(δ ),δ ) := δ − p(g,g|M1,hc(δ ),hc(δ ))/(uis2 (µ i,b(hc(δ )),µ1)−
uis2 (µ
i,g(hc(δ ),hc(δ )),µ−i,g(hc(δ ),hc(δ )))),
(1.11) implies that F(hc1(δ ),δ ) = 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂hc(δ )/∂δ =− ∂F(h
c(δ ),δ )/∂δ
∂F(hc(δ ),δ )/∂hc(δ )
,
where ∂F(hc(δ ),δ )/∂δ = 1 > 0, and
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∂F(hc(δ ),δ )/∂hc(δ ) =− ∂ p(g,g|.)/∂hc(δ )ui2(µ i,b,µ1)−ui2(µ i,g,µ j,g)+
− p(g,g|.)((∂ui2(µ i,b,µ1)/∂µ i,b)(∂ p(g,g|.)/∂hc)−(∂ui2(Mg,g)/∂µ i,g)(∂µ i,g/∂hc(δ ))−)∂ui2(Mg,g)/∂µ−i,g)∂µ−i,g/∂hc)
(ui2(µ i,b,µ1)−ui2(Mg,g))2
< 0
The second inequality holds as: ∂ p(g,g|.)/∂hc > 0 and ∂uis2 /∂µ i2 > 0, ∂uis2 /∂µ−i2 > 0 and
∂µ i,g/∂hi∗ > 0 > ∂µ i,b/∂hi∗. Therefore ∂hc(δ )/∂δ > 0. To show lim
δ→∞
hc(δ ) = 1 it is enough
to show that ui2(µ
i,b,µ1)− ui2(µ i,g,µ−i,g) = 0 iff hi∗1 = h−i∗1 = 1. The if part holds as µ i,b =
µ i,g = µ−i,g = µ1 for hi∗1 = h
−i∗
1 = 1. The only if part holds as: h
c(δ ) < 1 → µ i,b(hc(δ )) >
µ i,g(hc(δ ),hc(δ )) and µ i,g(hc(δ ),hc(δ ))< µ1.
Moreover ∂ p(g,g|.)/∂µ i,∂ p(g,g|.)/∂µ−i > 0 and as shown above ∂ui2/∂ p(g,g|.)> 0 
Proof of Lemma 11. For the first part of Lemma 11, assume that rating agencies select β I1 = β II1 =
p(g,g|M1,H1). This implies that µ1 > µ . But if q1 = G then µ I2 = µ II2 = µ1, while if q1 = B for
R1 = (b,b) µ
i(−i)
2 = µ1 so µ
i(−i)
2 > µ1∀1, for ri1 = g, r j1 = b r j(i) = µ1/(µ1 + (1− µ1)hi∗t ) > µ1,
while for R1 = (g,g) µ
i(−i)
2 = µ1 or µ
−i(i)
2 = µ1. Therefore max{µ I(II)2 ,µ II(I)2 } ≥ µ1, therefore by
Assumption 6 if rating agencies select β I1 = β II1 = p(g,g|M1,H1), then β I∗2 = β II∗2 = p(g,g|M2,H2).
For the second part of the theorem in equilibrium, rating agencies choose bribes β It ,β IIt : β It +
β IIt = p(g,g|Mt ,Ht) only if they strictly prefer to receive a bribe, that is only if hI∗t = hII∗t = 0.
This is the case because an agency Ai that is indifferent between honest rating and the bribe β it =
p(g,g|Mt ,Ht)/2 will strictly prefer to request bribe β i = p(g,g|Mt ,Ht) 
Proof of Lemma 12. To prove the lemma, I first prove an intermediate result:
Result: For any pi ∈ [0,1], two signals with pi = pi have the same informative content of a single
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signal with pi = pi2.
Proof:Let s1,s2 be conditionally independent signals with pi = pi while s3 is a signal with pi = pi2
for some pi ∈ [0,1]. Then Pr{(s1,s2) = (g,g)|q = G} = Pr{s3 = g|q = G} = 1, and Pr{(s1,s2) =
(g,g)|q = B} = Pr{s3 = g|q = B} = pi2. So receiving signals (s1,s2) = (g,g) has the same in-
formative content as signal s3 = g. Moreover signals (s1,s2) 6= (g,g) have the same informative
content of signal s3 = b as Pr{(s1,s2) 6= (g,g)|q = G} = Pr{s3 = b|q = G} = 0 In monopoly
et = e∗((1−pi2)p(g)) and
p(g) = e/e+(1− e)Pr{r = g|q = B,µt ,h}.
In competition, if rating agencies coordinate on β it = β
j
t then et = e∗((1−pi2)p(g)) and
p(g,g) = e/e+(1− e)Pr{R = (g,g)|q = B,Mt ,H}.
The lemma holds as Pr{(rI,rII) = (g,g)|q = B,(µ,µ),(h,h)}< Pr{rM = g|q = B,µ,h} ∀µ,h 
Proof of Proposition 13. Step 1. eM1 = e
C
1 iff h
M
1 = f (pi,hC1 ), where f (pi,h
C
1 ) :=
1−pi
1+pi +
2pi
1+pi h
C
1 .
Step 2. µg( f (pi,hC1 )) < µ
g,g(hC1 ,h
C
1 ) ∀pi,hC1 as: µg( f (pi,hC1 )) = µ1pi
2
yM(µt ,ht)
= (µ1pi2/yC(Mt ,Ht)) <
(µ1pi(pi+(1−pi)(1−µ1)(1−hCi1 ))/yC(µ It ,µ IIt ,hIt ,hIIt )) = µg,g(hC1 ,hC1 ).
Where yM(µt ,ht) := pi2+(1−pi2)(1−µt)(1−ht) and yC(µ It ,µ IIt hIt ,hIIt ) := pi2+pi(1−pi)ΣI,II(1−
µ it )(1−hit).
Step 3. If pi > 1/3 then µb( f (pi,hC1 )) > (µ
b,g(hC1 ,h
C
1 ) + µ1)/2 for h
C
1 ∈ (max(0,(2µ1pi − (1−
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pi))/(2µ1pi−2pi)),1).
Step 4: pi > 13 is sufficient to ensure ∂u
M
2 (p(g|µ2))/∂µ2 > ∂uC2 (p(g,g|µ2))/∂µ2|p(g|µ2)=p(g,g|M2)
∀p(g|µ2)
∂uM2 (p(g|µ2))/∂µ2 = (∂uM2 (p(g|.))/∂ p(g|.))(∂ p(g|)/∂yM2 )(∂yM2 /∂µM2 ) =
=−(1− (1−pi2)p(g|.)(∂e2/∂b))(∂ p(g|.)/∂yM2 )(1−pi2).
∂uC,I2 (p(g,g|MC2 ))/∂MC2 = (∂uC,I2 (p(g,g|MC2 ))/∂µ I2)+(∂uC,I2 (p(g,g|MC2 ))/∂µ II2 ) =
= (∂uC,I2 (p(g,g|MC2 ))/∂ p(g,g|.))(∂ p(g,g|.)/∂yC2 )((∂yC2/∂µ I2)+(∂yC2/∂µ I2)) =
=−(12(e2+(1− e2)(2pi−pi2))−pi(1−pi)p(g,g|.)(∂e2/∂ p(g,g|.)))(∂ p(g,g|.)/∂yC2 )(2pi(1−pi))
Note that −(∂ p(g|.)/∂yM2 ) =−(∂ p(g,g|.)/∂yC2 )> 0. So:
∂uM2 (p(g|µ2))/∂µ2 > ∂uC2 (p(g,g|µC2 ))/∂µC2 ↔ (1− (1− pi2)b(∂e2/∂ p))(1+ pi) > (12(e2 +(1−
e2)pi(2−pi))−pi(1−pi)b(∂e2/∂ p))2pi
A sufficient condition to ensure that the last inequality holds is:
(1− (1− pi2)e2)(1+ pi) > ((1/2)(e2 +(1− e2)pi(2− pi))− pi(1− pi)e2)2pi . This condition holds
∀e2 ∈ [0,1] if pi > 1/3.
Step 5. uM2 (µb( f (pi,hC1 )))−uM2 (µg( f (pi,hC1 ))) =
´ µb( f (pi,hC1 ))
µg( f (pi,hC1 ))
(∂uM2 /∂ p(g|µM2 ))(∂ p(g|µM2 )/∂yM2 )(∂yM2 /∂µ2)dµ2 >
>
´ µb( f (pi,hC1 ))
µg( f (pi,hC1 ))
(∂uC2/∂ p(g,g|µC2 ))(∂ p(g,g|µC2 )/∂yC2 )(∂yC2/∂µ2)dµ2.
By step 4, the inequality holds for pi > 1/3. By steps 2 and 3, the following inequality holds for
hC1 ∈ (max{0,(1−pi−2µ1pi)/2pi(1−µ)},1).
ˆ µb( f (pi,hC1 ))
µg( f (pi,hC1 ))
(∂uC2/∂ p(g,g|µC2 ))(∂ p(g,g|µC2 )/∂yC2 )(∂yC2/∂µ2)dµ2 >
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´ (µb,g(hC1 ,hC1 )+µ1)/2
µg,g(hC1 ,h
C
1 )
(∂uC2/∂ p(g,g|µC2 ))(∂ p(g,g|µC2 )/∂yC2 )(∂yC2/∂µ2)dµ2
= uC2 (µ
b,g(0),µ1)−uC2 (µg,g(0),µg,g(0)).
Step 6: By Corollary (2) for δ large enough hC1 ∈ (max{0,(1−pi−2µ1pi)/2pi(1−µ1)},1).
By step 5, hC1 ∈ (max{0,(1−pi−2µ1pi)/2pi(1−µ)},1) and pi > 13 ensure hM1 > f (pi,hC1 ) and there-
fore eM1 > e
C
1
As hC1 ∈ [0,1] is increasing in δ and every hC1 ∈ [0,1] is chosen in equilibrium for some δ , and for
δ < min{δM,δC}eM1 < eC1 .
By Corollary (2) and Corollary (1) eM1 and e
C
1 are continuous functions of δ . Therefore there is a
unique δ ∗ s.t. eM1 = eC1 and e
M
1 > e
C
1 iff δ > δ
∗ 
Proof of Lemma 14. (1.1) and (1.12) hold at the same time iff
p(g,g|Mt ,H) = f L(e((1−pi)p(g,g|Mt ,H))), where f L(x) := x/(x+(1− x)aS), and
aS := pi+(1−pi)ΠI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi).
Applying the same steps followed in Lemma 2, the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of an x ∈ (0,1) : x = f L(e((1−pi)x)) is:
∂ f L(e((1−pi)x))/∂x|x=0 > 1 (i). (i) holds for every H ∈ [0,1]2 iff (1− µ It )(1− µ IIt ) < 1/c′′(0)−
pi/(1−pi) 
Proof of Lemma 15. Whether agencies observe independent signals (and demand high bribes) or
correlated signals, the issues sets e∗ = e((1− pi2)p(g,g|Mt ,H)). Therefore, effort is larger with
identical signals iff:
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Pr{Rt = [g,g]|Mt ,H,e∗, indep}> Pr{Rt = [g,g]|Mt ,H,e∗, ident}↔
↔ pi2+pi(1−pi)Σi(1−µ it )(1−hi)> pi2+(1−pi2)Πi(1−µ it )(1−hi)↔
Σi(1−µ it )(1−hi)/Πi(1−µ it )(1−hi)> (1+pi)/pi .
For µ It = µ IIt := µt and h
I
= h
II
:= h the condition reduces to: (1−µt)(1−h)< 2pi/(1+pi) 
Proof of Proposition 16. The only equilibrium strategies left to define are hI1,h
II
1 . I focus on equi-
libria in which hI1 = h
II
1 (I will refer to them as h
cs). I show that if δ ≤ δ cs , for a δ cs defined below,
hcs = 0. If instead δ > δ
cs , there is a unique hcs such that for hi∗t = h
j∗
t = hcs a strategic agency is
indifferent to request a bribe or not. In equilibrium β it is paid only if A j is also requesting a bribe,
in which case a strategic agency faces a tradeoff between demanding a bribe and obtaining a con-
tinuation payoff equal to p(g,g|.)+δui2(µ i,g,µ j,g) and rating honestly and getting δui2(µ i,b,µ i,b1 ).
Step 1. p(g,g|Mt ,Het ) ∈C1 is increasing in µ it , µ jt , hiet and h jet (analogous to proof of Prop. 4)
Step 2.∂ (p(g,g|.)+δui2(µ i,g,µ j,g))/∂hi1+∂ (p(g,g|.)+δui2(µ i,g,µ j,g))/∂h j1|hI1=hII1 =hcs > 0:
I prove this inequality in two intermediate steps.
(1.14) ensures (∂µ i,g/∂h j1)> 0 ∀i, j ∈ {I, II}, and
∂ui2(M2,0,0)/∂µ
i
2 = (
∂ p(g,g|M2,0,0)
∂µ i2
) ∂ (1/2)((e2+(1−e2)(pi+(1−pi)(1−µ
j(i))))p(g,g|.)−c(e2))
∂ p(g.g|.) =
(∂ p(g,g|M2,0,0)/∂µ i2)(e2/2+((1− e2)/2)(pi+(1−pi)(1−µ j(i)))+
−∂e∗((1−pi2)x)/∂x|x=p(g,g|M2,0,0)(1−µ j(i))(1−pi)p(g,g|.))> 0
The inequality holds as ∂ p(g,g|M2,0,0)/∂µ i2 > 0, and ∂e∗((1−pi2)x)/∂x|x=p(g,g|M2,0,0)p(g,g|) <
e2
(see Proof of Prop. 4).
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Finally, ∂ p(g,g|M1,hc,hc)/∂hi1 > 0 ∀i ∈ {I, II}.
Step 3. ∂ui2(µ
i,b
2 ,µ
i,b
1 )/∂h
i
1+∂u
i
2(µ
i,b
2 ,µ
i,b
1 )/∂h
j
1 < 0: the inequality holds as
∂µ i,b/∂hi1 < 0 = ∂u
i
2(µ
i,b
2 ,µ1)/∂h
j
1.
The rest of the proof is identical to step 2).
Step 4. Analogous to Step 4 in Proof of Prop. 4 
Proof of Corollary 3. The Proof follows the same steps of the Proof of Corollary 2 
Proof of Proposition 17. Assume that there is a δ ∗∗ such that for that value of the discount factor,
monopoly and competition ensure that same effort in the first period.
Step 1. Same effort requires: eM1 = e
C
1 ↔p(g|µ1,hM∗1 ) = p(g,g|µ1,µ1,hc∗1 ,hc∗1 )↔
hM∗1 = f
S(µ1,hc∗1 ) := 1− (1−µ1)(1−hc∗1 )2.
Step 2. Same effort implies same reputation updates, that is: µg( f S(µ1,hc∗1 )) = µ
i,g(hc∗1 ,h
c∗
1 )
and µb( f S(µ1,hC1 )) = µ
i,b(hC1 ,h
C
1 ).
This is the case as: µg( f S(µ1,hc∗1 )) = µ1pi
2/(pi2+(1−pi2)(1−µ1)(1−hM∗1 )) = µ1pi2/(pi2+(1−
pi2)(1− µ1)2(1− hc∗1 )2) = µ i,g(hc∗1 ,hc∗1 ). µb( f S(µ1,hc∗1 )) = µ1/(1− (1− µ1)(1− hM1 )) = µ1/(1−
(1−µ1)2(1−hc∗1 )2) = µ i,b(hc∗1 ,hc∗1 ).
Step 3.
Pr{r1 = g|q1 = B,ht = 0} := yM(µt ,0) = pi2+(1−pi2)(1−µt)> pi2+(1−pi2)(1−µt)2 =
= Pr{R1 = (g,g)|q1 = B,Ht = (0,0)} := yM(µt ,0), ∀µt < 1.
And ∂y
M(µ2,0)/∂µ2
∂yCs(µ2,0)/∂µ2
= 12(1−µ2) > 1↔ µ2 > 1/2. By Assumption 1, µ2 > µM := 1/c′′(0) = 1/2.
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Step 4. By Steps 2 and 3, hM∗1 = f
S(µ1,hc∗1 )→ yM(µb,0)−yM(µg,0)> yC(µ i,b,0)−yC(µ i,g,0) and
yM(µb,0)> yCs(µ i,b,µ i,b,0,0), and yM(µg,0)> yCs(µ i,g,µ i,g,0,0).
Step 5. Let F(y, p) := p− (1−pi2)p/2
(1−pi2)p/2+(1−(1−pi2)p/2)y , then by the Implicit Function Theorem p =
p(y) and p′(y) = 1−2/(1−pi
2)
(1−yt)2 < 0 and
p′′(yt) =
1−2/(1−pi2)
(1−yt)3 < 0.
By step 4, for identical effort in the first period,
p(g|µb,0)− p(g|µg,0)> p(g,g|µ i,b,µ i,b,0,0)− p(g,g|µ i,g,µ i,g,0,0).
Step 6. For µ i( j) = 0: uC2 (p2) = (p2− c(e2))/2 = uM2 (p2)/2.
As utility uC2 (p2) = u
M
2 (p2)/2 and d
2uM2 (b2)/d
2b2 =−(1−pi2)/2 < 0, by step 5:
ui2(µ
i,g(hCs1 ,h
Cs
1 ),µ
i,g(hCs1 ,h
Cs
1 ),0)−ui2(µ i,b(hCs1 ,hCs1 ),µ j1 ,µb( j)(h1(δ ))<
< 12(u
i
2(µ
b(h∗1(δ )))−ui2(µg(h∗1(δ )))).
As for identical effort in the first period βC1 = β
M
1 /2, then if the monopolist is indifferent to offer a
bribe, the competitors strictly prefer to offer a bribe.
Step 7. This in turn implies that, for any δ > δ
c
, monopoly induces more effort than competition.
This is the case because if competitors are indifferent to lying, or to being honest for hc∗, then the
monopolist must choose in equilibrium an hM∗1 > f
S(µ1,hc∗1 ). The continuity of h
M∗
1 (δ ) ensures that
there is a unique δ ∗∗ s.t. eM1 = eC1 . Moreover, e
M
1 > e
C
1 ↔δ > δ ∗∗ 
Proof of Lemma 18. First, I show δ ∗ < δ
c
. At first, I assume there is a δ ∗ for which eM1 = eC1 ,
and I show that for δ = δ ∗ if in equilibrium a (strategic) monopolist rating agency is indifferent to
request a bribe then a (strategic) competing rating agency which strictly prefers to request a bribe.
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Therefore, δ ∗ is unique and the monopoly ensures a higher level of effort in the first period iff
δ > δ ∗ . I use this observation and the continuity of hM∗1 w.r.t. δ to show that δ ∗ exists and satisfies
δ ∗ < δC.
Step 1. eM1 = e
C
1 ↔ hM1 = f (hC1 ) := (1−pi+2pihC1 )/(1+pi).
eMt = e
C
t ↔ p(g|µt ,hM∗t ) = p(g,g|Mt ,H∗t ).
Step 2. condition 1 implies
hM1 = f (h
C
1 )→ yM(µg(hM1 ),0)−yM(µb(hM1 ),0)> yC(µg,g(hC1 ,hC1 ),0)−yC((µg,b(hC1 ,hC1 )+µ1)/2,0).
Where yM(µt ,ht) := pi2+(1−pi2)(1−µt)(1−ht) and
yC(µ It ,µ IIt hIt ,hIIt ) := pi2+pi(1−pi)ΣI,II(1−µ it )(1−hit).
This is the case as
hM1 = f (h
C
1 )→ µb−µg > (µg,b+µ1)/2−µg,g for any µ1 ≥max
{
0,g(hC1 ,pi)
}
(condition 2).
Where g(hC1 ,pi) := (−2+4hC1 +3pi−4hC1pi−pi2+2hC1pi2)/(−4+4hC1 +4pi−4hC1pi−2pi2+2hC1pi2).
Note that ∂g(hC1 ,pi)/∂pi < 0, ∂g(h
C
1 ,pi)/∂h
C
1 < 0 and g(h
C
1 ,pi)< 1/2, ∀hC1 ,pi .
Assumption 2 ensures that condition 2 holds.
µb(hM1 )−µg(hM1 )> (µg,b(hC1 ,hC1 )+µ1)/2−µg,g(hC1 ,hC1 )→
(1−pi2)(µb(hM1 )−µg(hM1 ))> 2pi(1−pi)((µg,b(hC1 ,hC1 )+µ1)/2−µg,g(hC1 ,hC1 ))→
yM(µg(hM1 ),0)− yM(µb(hM1 ),0)> yC(µg,g(hC1 ,hC1 ),0)− yC((µg,b(hC1 ,hC1 )+µ1)/2,0).
Step 3. hM1 = f (h
C
1 )→ yM(µg(hM1 ),0)> yC(µg,g(hC1 ,hC1 ),0).
3.a yM(µt ,0)> yC(µt ,µt ,0,0) ∀µt < 1.
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3.b µg( f (hC1 )) = µ1pi
2/yM(µ1, f (hC1 )) =
= µ1pi2/yC(µ1,hC1 )< (µ1pi(pi+(1−pi)(1−µ1)(1−hC1 )))/yC(µ,h) =
= µg,g(hC1 ,h
C
1 ).
Step 4. p(g|µt ,ht) = k(yM(µt ,ht)) and p(g,g|Mt ,Ht) = k(yC(µt ,µt ,hIt ,hIIt )) where k(x) := (1−
(2/(1−pi2))x)/(1− x).
So the price is decreasing and concave in yt .
Therefore, by Steps 2 and 3: p(g|µb(hM1 ),0)− p(g|µg(hM1 ))>
> p(g,g|µb,g(hC1 ,hC1 ))− p(g,g|µg,g(hC1 ,hC1 )).
Step 5. The utility in the second period can be expressed as a function of the price in case of
favorable ratings
uM2 (p) := e((1−pi2)p)+(1− e((1−pi2)p)pi2)p− c(p)+
+(1− e((1−pi2)p)(1−pi2)p = p− c(e((1−pi2)p)),
uC2 (p) := (1/2)(e((1−pi2)p)+(1− e((1−pi2)p)pi2))p− c(e((1−pi2)p))+
+(1− e((1−pi2)p)pi(1−pi)p,
where e((1−pi2)p) = (1−pi2)p/2. Then
∂uM2 (p(g|.))/∂ p(g|.)> ∂uC2 (p(g,g|.))/∂ p(g,g|.)> 0
∂uM2 (p)/∂ p = 1− (1−pi2)2 p/2 > 0 and d2uM2 (p)/d p2 =−(1−pi2)2/2 < 0.
∂uC2 (p)/∂ p = (1−pi2)/2
(
(1−pi2)/2−pi(1−pi)) p+(1− (1−pi2)p/2)pi(1−pi)> 0.
So ∂uM2 (p)/∂ p > ∂uC2 (p)/∂ p ∀p
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Step 6. By steps 4 and 5 eM1 = e
C
1 implies
p(g|µb(hM1 ),0) = p(g,g|µb,g(hC1 ,hC1 ))
and if p(g|µ1,hM1 ,0)≥ δ (uM2 (µb(hM1 ))−uM2 (µg(hM1 ))) then
p(g,g|µb,g(hC1 ,hC1 ))> δ (uC2 (µg,b)−uC2 (µg,g)).
This implies that for δ ≥ δC hM∗1 > f (hC∗1 ). As eM is a continuous function of δ and eM < eC for
δ = 0, then it must be the case that δ ∗ exists and satisfies δ ∗ < δ
C
As δ ∗ < δ
C
and δ ∗∗ < δ
C
δ ∗∗ > δ ∗ iff f S(0) > f (0) ( f S(0) is defined in the Proof of Proposition
17) which is equivalent to µ1 > (1−2pi)/(1+pi) 
Proof of Lemma 34. (1.6) and (3.4) hold at the same time iff
p(g,g|Mt ,H) = f L(e((1−pi)(1+pi− (pi/2)ΣI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi)p(g,g|Mt ,H))),
where f L(x) := x/(x+(1− x)aL), and
aL := pi2+ΣI,II(1−pi)pi(1−µ it )(1−hi)+(1−pi)2ΠI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi).
Applying the same steps followed in Lemma 2, the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of an x ∈ (0,1) : x = f L(e((1−pi)(1+pi− (pi/2)ΣI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi)x)) is:
∂ f L(e((1−pi)(1+pi− pi2 ∑I,II(1−µ it )(1−h
i
)x)))/∂x|x=0 > 1 (i). (i) holds for every H ∈ [0,1]2 iff
µ it +µ
j
t −µ itµ jt (1−pi)c′′(0)/(c′′(0)+pi)> c′′(0)/(c′′(0)+pi)(1−pi)− (1−pi)/(c′′(0)+pi)
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Let
φ t := (e
∗
t +(1− e∗t )(pi+pi(1−pi)ΣI,II(1−µ it )(1−hi)/2)p(g,g|Mt ,H)− c(e∗t ).
I rule out pathological equilibria in which some type of rating agency requests φ ∗t > φ t . In any equi-
librium in which µ(φt) = µt∀µt Assumption 5 ensures that both types of agency set φ ∗t = φ t/2. If
instead in equilibrium µ i(φ ′t ) 6= µ it for some φ ′t , by Assumption 2 φ ′t must be on the equilibrium path
for some type of agency Ai. But this implies that there exists at least another φ ′′t on the equilibrium
path s.t. µ i(φ ′t ) 6= µ i(φ ′′t ). W.l.g. let µ I(φ ′t )> µ I(φ ′′t ) (i). If the honest type strictly prefers φ ′′t over
φ ′t , then µ i(φ ′t ) = 0 which contradicts (i). If the honest type is indifferent or strictly prefers φ ′t over
φ ′′t , then the strategic type strictly prefers φ ′t over φ ′′t because β (M(φ ′t ),H) > β (M(φ ′′t ),H), which
implies that either µ i(φ ′′t ) = 1 which contradicts (i) or φ ′′t is out of the equilibrium path, which is
also a contradiction 
Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 19. There exists an equilibrium in which buyers bid: bc ≤ bnc =VL and the issuer
chooses rq = 0 for any q and any schedule of fees. In this equilibrium, certification does not take
place 
Proof of Lemma 20. For a schedule of fees φI , φR the agency chooses e(φI,φR) > 0 only if she
expects the reputation cost from rating with no information to be higher than the cost of effort. The
expected reputation cost depends on her beliefs over the participation choice of the issuer, denoted
as reH(φI,φR) and reL(φI,φR). Choosing e(φI,φR) > 0 is optimal whenever the following condition
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holds:
(1−α)reL(ρ−φR)/(αreH +(1−α)reL)≥C > 0→ ρ−φR > 0.
Therefore, whenever e(φI,φR)> 0 is optimal, c(φI,φR) = 0 is the only seq. rational choice 
Proof of Proposition 21. Assume:
C > (1−α)ρ, (3.8)
and consider the case βVL ≥ (1−α)ρ . In the unique set of equilibria with certification the agency
announces φI +φR ≡ φ = β (bc−bnc) and chooses e = 0: as the issuer chooses rq = 1 for any q her
expected payoff is:
UC = β (bc−bnc)− (1−α)ρ ≡U .
where bc = VL and bnc ∈ [0,bc− 1−αβ ρ]. For these strategies issuer and buyers have no profitable
deviations and neither does the agency: if φ > bc− bnc, then UC = 0, as rH = rL = 0, if instead
φ ∈ (β (bc−bnc),bc−bnc], then UC = (1−α)(bc−bnc−ρ) <U , by Assumption 1 as rH = 0 and
rL = 1. Finally, if she announces φ < β (bc− bnc), then UC ≤ φ − (1−α)ρ < U , as rH = 1 and
rL ∈ [0,1]. For rH = rL = 1 (3.8) implies that e = 0 is the unique seq. rat. choice and if the agency
is expected to choose e = 0, rL = 1 is the unique seq. rat. choice, while rH = 1 is the unique choice
in equilibrium: if rH < 1 the equilibrium is not defined as the agency can get a payoff indefinetly
close to U by announcing:
φ = β (bc−bnc)− ε for ε →+ 0.
Finally, in equilibrium it can not be the case that rH and rL are s.t. the agency finds it seq. rational
to set e > 0, as in that case the agency obtains a payoff UC <U and an equilibrium is not defined by
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the argument presented in the last paragraph for the rH < 1 case.
Therefore, for βVL− (1−α)ρ ≥ 0 in the unique equilibrium with certification v˜c = VL and v˜nc
is not defined. A corollary of this proof is that for βVL < (1−α)ρ there is no equilibrium with
certification: in equilibrium the agency announces φ ≥ bc−bnc, and induces:
rH = rL = 0 and bc < bnc,
where bnc = v˜nc =VL, while v˜c is not defined 
Proof of Proposition 22. With an abuse of notation, I refer to rH ∈ [0,1] as a strategy in which
the agency participates w. p. rH for q = H (and similarly for rL). Following φI,φR : φI + φR >
β (bc− bnc), rH = 0 and the maximum expected payoff for the agency equals U1 ≡ max{0,(1−
α)(bc−bnc−ρ)}. Let the agency announce:
φI,φR : φI +φR ≤ β (bc−bnc). (1)
Consider first the case φR ≤ ρ−C/(1−α).
If φI +φR < β (bc−bnc), the set of seq. rat. choices of the issuer are rH = 1 and rL = r(rH ,φR), if
φI > 0, or rL ∈ [r(rH ,φR),1] if φI = 0. Where:
r(x,y)≡ αxC/(1−α)(ρ−C− y)
The choice of effort is
e = f (φI,φR,bc−bnc) if rL < 1, e ∈ [0, f (φI,φR)] if rL = 1.
Where: f (x,y,z)≡ 1− xz−y . The agency expected payoff is: U2(φI,φR)≡ α(φI +φR)+ αC(φI+φR−ρ)(ρ−C−φR)
if φI > 0, and some x≤U2(φI,φR) if φI = 0. Note that:
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supφI<β (bc−bnc)−φR UC =U2(φR)≡U2(β (bc−bnc)−φR,φR), ∀φR.
If φI+φR = β (bc−bnc), for φI > 0 there is a continuum of sets of seq. rat. choices characterized by:
rH ∈ [0,1], rL = r(rH ,φR) and e= f (φI,φR,bc−bnc). The agency payoff is given by UC = rHU2(φR).
Instead for φI = 0, rH ∈ [0,1], rL = [r(rH ,φR),1] and e = f (0,φR, ,bc− bnc) = 1 and the payoff
satisfies UC ≤ rHU2(φR).
Let instead φR > ρ− C1−α .If φI < β (bc−bnc)−φR, the set of seq. rat. choices are: rH = 1, rL = 1
and e = 0. The payoff is
U3(φI,φR)≡ φI +φR− (1−α)ρ .
Note that: supφI<β (bc−bnc)−φR U3(φI,φR) =U3(φR)≡U3(β (bc−bnc)−φR,φR), ∀φR.
If instead φI = β (bc− bnc)−φR, there is a continuum of sets of seq. rat. choices characterized by
rH ∈ [0,1] and rL =min{1,r(rH ,φR)}. The effort choice is: e= 0 if r(rH ,φR)> 1, e= f (φI,φR,bc−
bnc) if r(rH ,φR)< 1 and e∈ [0, f (φI,φR,bc−bnc)] otw. For any given φR the largest expected payoff
is obtained for rH = 1 and equals U3(φR). If in a seq. equilibrium the agency announces with pos.
prob. fees that satisfy (1), it must be the case that φI +φR = β (bc−bnc) and rH = 1 for those fees,
as in any other case the agency has a profitable deviation. Note that
U2(ρ− C1−α ) =U3(φR), ∀φR ≥ ρ− C1−α , and U2(ρ− C1−α )>U1
by Assumption 1. Moreover, U2(φR) is continuous, differentiable and U
′
2(φR) > (<)0 iff β (bc−
bnc)> (<)ρ .
Therefore in any equilibrium with certification φI = β (bc−bnc)−φR, and
• if β (bc−bnc)> ρ: φR ∈ [ρ−C/(1−α),β (bc−bnc)],
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• if β (bc−bnc) = ρ: φR ∈ [0,β (bc−bnc)],
• if β (bc−bnc)< ρ:
– φR = 0 if U2(0)≥ 0 (↔ β (bc−bnc)≥C),
– φR > bc−bnc→ rH = rL = 0 and no certification otherwise 
Proof of Proposition 23. Define
vc(x,y)≡ αβ−(1−α)r(1,x)(1− f (βy−x,x,y))αβ+(1−α)r(1,x)(1− f (βy−x,x)) ,
where f (.) and r(.) are defined as in the Proof of Result 22. vc(φR,bc−bnc) is the expected value of
a certified security when ψ = L, rH = 1, rL = r(1,φR), φI +φR = β (bc−bnc) and e = f (φI,φR,bc−
bnc). Note that for
φR ∈ [0,β (bc−bnc)]∩ [0,ρ− C1−α ],
vc(φR,bc− bnc) is continuous and differentiable. From Result 22, for β (bc− bnc) ∈ [C,ρ), φI =
β (bc−bnc), φR = 0 and therefore
v˜c = vc(0,bc−bnc) = (ρ−2C)/C,
and v˜nc =−1. An equilibrium with β (bc−bnc) ∈ [C,ρ) exists iff
(C,ρ) ∈ set1 ≡
{
(x1,x2) ∈ R2+ : (β (x2−2x1)/x2) ∈ [x1,x2)
}
.
This condition is equivalent to:
1)β (ρ−2C/ρ)< ρ ↔ ρ /∈ [(β −
√
β 2−8Cβ )/2, f2(C)],
2) β (ρ−2C/ρ)≥C↔C ≤ βρ/(2β +ρ).
Where f2(C) ≡ (β +
√
β 2−8Cβ )/2. As ∂vc(x,ρ/β )/∂x < 0, an equilibrium in which β (bc−
bnc) = ρ exists iff:
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(C,ρ) ∈ set2 ≡
{
(x1,x2) ∈ R2+ : β (x2−2x1/x2)≥ x2
}
or equivalently ρ /∈ [(β −
√
β 2−8Cβ )/2, f2(C)]. In particular, v˜c = max{ρ/β ,VL}, and v˜nc =−1
whenever v˜c >VL (for v˜c =VL, v˜nc is not defined). If ρ/β ∈ (vc(ρ−C/(1−α),ρ/β ),vc(0,ρ/β )],
in equilibrium the agency announces φR : vc(φR,ρ/β ), e = f (ρ − φR,φR,ρ/β ) and rL = r(1,φR).
If instead ρ/β ∈ (VL,vc(ρ −C/(1−α),ρ/β )], in equilibrium φR = ρ −C/(1−α), rL = 1 and e
satisfies
(αβ − (1−α)(1− e))/(αβ +(1−α)(1− e)) = ρ/β .
If ρ/β ≤VL, then φR = ρ−C/(1−α), e = 0 and bnc =VL−ρ/β .
From Proposition 22, for β (bc−bnc)> ρ the agency sets φI = β (bc−bnc)−φR and φR≥ ρ−C/(1−
α). If φR > ρ−C/(1−α), then v˜c =VL and v˜nc is not defined. When instead φR = ρ−C/(1−α),
either v˜c = VL and v˜nc is not defined, or v˜c ∈ (VL,vc(ρ −C/(1−α),bc− bnc)] and v˜nc = −1. Wlg
I consider only equilibria in which φR = ρ −C/(1−α). Note that ∂vc(x,y)/∂y < 0, ∀x,y, and
1 > vc(ρ −C/(1−α),1).7 Therefore. iff ρ/β < vc(ρ −C/(1−α),ρ/β ) there exists a unique
x ∈ (VL,1)∩ (ρ/β ,1) that satisfies x = vc(ρ −C/(1−α),x). Denoting v˜2 this unique value, then
v˜2 = v˜∗(ρ−C/(1−α)), where:
v˜∗(x)≡ (2α−1+(αβ +1−α)x/β +
√
[1−2α− (αβ +1−α)x/β ]2−4x(α− (1−α)/β ))/2.
ρ/β < vc(ρ−C/(1−α),ρ/β ) is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium in which
β (bc− bnc) > ρ to exist. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the condition is equivalent to: ρ < f1(C),
where
7∂vc(x,y)/∂y < 0 if vc(x,y)≥ 0 which is ensured ∀x,y by Assumption 1.
101
f1(C)≡ (β − C1−β (αβ+1−αα(1−α) )+
√
(β − C1−β (αβ+1−αα(1−α) ))2+ 4Cβ1−β ( β1−α − 1α ))/2.
Let set3≡
{
(x1,x2) ∈ R2+ : x2 < f1(x1)
}
. Iff (C,ρ)∈ set3, for any z∈ [VL, v˜2]∩(ρ/β , v˜2] there exists
an equilibrium ensuring v˜c = z. If v˜c >VL, v˜nc =−1, otherwise v˜nc is not defined.
Finally, I show that set3 ⊂ set2, and therefore for any set of parameters for which an equilibrium
with β (bc− bnc) > ρ exists there is no equilibrium with β (bc− bnc) < ρ . Assume an equilibrium
with βvc > ρ exists. This implies v˜2 > ρ/β . Note also that:
(ρ−2C)/ρ = vc(0,ρ/β )> vc(ρ−C/(1−α),ρ/β )> vc(ρ−C/(1−α), v˜2) = v˜2 > ρ.
So β v˜2 > ρ implies β (ρ−2C)/ρ > ρ or equivalently set3 ⊂ set2 
Proof of Proposition 24. If C > (1−α)ρ , in any equilibrium in which rH > 0 and/or rL > 0, the
agency chooses e = 0 regardless of φR. Therefore for any cap φR ≥ 0 the equilibria are identical to
the one described in Result 23.
Let instead C ≤ (1−α)ρ . If C > βρ/(2β +ρ) from the Proof of Result 22 and the Proof of Result
23 certification does not take place. Moreover for any set of bids, the fees that ensure the highest
payoff for the agency while ensuring certification with positive probability are φI = β (bc−bnc) and
φR = 0. An equilibrium with those fees does not exists as it would entail a negative expected payoff
of the agency. Therefore imposing a cap has no effect.
If instead C < βρ/(2β +ρ), in equilibrium if φR > ρ−C/(1−α), v˜c =VL and v˜nc =−1. If φR ≤
ρ−C/(1−α) the most informative equilibrium (which is also the unique for φR < ρ−C/(1−α))
ensures v˜nc =−1 and v˜c = vc(φR, v˜c) (for the definition of vc(., .) see the Proof of Result 23).
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Therefore v˜c is a continuous and differentiable function of φR. If β v˜c ≥ ρ −C, then ∂ v˜c/∂φR ≤ 0.
If instead β v˜c < ρ−C:
∂ v˜c/∂φR > 0 iff φR > β v˜c−
√
(1−β )(ρ−C−β v˜c)v˜c
In equilibrium the agency sets φR > 0 only if β (bc−bnc)≥ ρ → β v˜c ≥ ρ → β v˜c ≥ ρ−C.
Therefore imposing a cap φR = 0 maximizes v˜c in equilibrium. And from Result 23 it ensures
v˜c = (ρ−2C)/ρ 
Proof of Proposition 25. As C = 0 it is wlg to consider only equilibria with e= 1. Let ρ > β . On the
equilibrium path the agency sets: φ ∗I ,φ ∗R : φ ∗I +φ ∗R = β , chooses c= 0 and the issuer chooses: rH = 1,
rL = 0 and the buyers bid bc = 1, bnc = 0. The issuer has no profitable deviations and the expected
payoff of the agency is pi = αβ . The agency cannot obtain a higher payoff by announcing different
fees: setting φI,φR : φI +φR < β ensures pi ≤ α(φI +φR)< αβ , while choosing φI,φR : φI +φR > β
ensures, by Assumption 1:
pi = max{0,(1−α)(1−ρ)}< (1−α)(1−β )< αβ .
This is the unique equilibrium as for ρ > β the agency cannot obtain more than pi = αβ in equi-
librium. Moreover, this is the unique equilibrium ensuring pi = αβ , and any set of strategies
that ensures pi < αβ cannot be an equilibrium: the agency can obtain profits pi ′ > pi by setting:
φI +φR = β − ε , for ε = (αβ −pi)/2α .
Let ρ ≤ β . An equilibrium with bc− bnc < ρ/β does not exist. For those bids the agency sets
φI +φR = β (bc−bnc) and certifies only high-quality security in which case v˜c = 1 and v˜nc =−1→
v˜c 6= bc.
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For bc− bnc ≥ ρ/β , the unique strategies that can be part of an equilibrium are: for the agency to
set φI = β (bc−bnc)−φR and φR ≥ ρ and choose
e ∈ [(β (bc−bnc)−ρ)/(bc−bnc−ρ),1] ,
if φR = ρ and c= 1, if φR > ρ and for the issuer to choose rH = rL = 1 for those fees.In equilibrium,
v˜c = f (c), where
f (x)≡ (αβ − (1−α)x)/(αβ +(1−α)x),
and therefore v˜c ∈ [VL, f (β (bc−bnc)−ρ)/(bc−bnc−ρ)))].
In equilibrium, it must be the case that v˜c = bc and whenever v˜c > f (1), bnc = 0, therefore
v˜c ≤ f ((β v˜c−ρ)/(v˜c−ρ)), which is equivalent to v˜c ≤ v˜∗(ρ). v˜∗(x) is defined as in the Proof of
Result 23. Any v˜c ∈ [max{VL,ρ/β} , v˜∗(ρ)] can be sustained in equilibrium, if the agency chooses
the appropriate c ∈ [0,(β (bc−bnc)−φR)/(bc−bnc−φR)] 
Proof of Lemma 26. φR≤ φR < ρ→ in equilibrium c= 0, φI+φR = β , rH = 1 and rL = 0. Therefore,
v˜c = 1 and v˜nc =−1 
Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 27. Assume p > λ−. At this price, the consumer purchases only if st = H. Then
firm profits are pi(p) = φ(λ )p(1− pλ+ ), and the price that maximizes profits is p∗(λ ) = λ
+
2 . Note
that p∗(λ ) = λ
+
2 ≥ λ− iff: α ≥ 2−
√
2 and λ < 2−4α+α
2
2−5α+2α2 .
Assume instead that p < λ−. Then, firm profits are pi(p) = p(1− (1−φ(λ )λ− + φ(λ )λ+ )p), and the price
that maximizes profits is p∗∗(λ ) = λ
+λ−
2(λ++φ(λ )(λ−−λ+)) . Notice that p
∗∗ < λ−↔
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α ≤ 12
√
−4+12λ−7λ 2
(5−14λ+8λ 2)2 +
6−15λ+8λ 2
2(5−14λ+8λ 2) .
Comparing the profits for the two prices:
UF(p∗(λ ))>UF(p∗∗(λ ))↔ φ(λ )p∗(λ )(1− p∗(λ )λ+ )> p∗∗(λ )(1− (1−φ(λ )λ− + φ(λ )λ+ )p∗∗(λ ))→
φ(λ )p∗(λ )
2 >
p∗∗(λ )
2 → λ+ ≥ 1+φ(λ )φ(λ ) λ− (condition 1). Condition 1 is equivalent to α > 23 and λ <
3α−2
2α−1 . Condition 1 implies p
∗ ≥ λ− and if condition 1 does not hold, then p∗∗ ≤ λ−. So the
monopolist sets p = p∗ iff condition 1 is satisfied 
Proof of Lemma 28. We first show four useful properties of the static game pricing strategy.
Property 1 : If λ satisfies condition 1 in Lemma 1: v(λ )= v∗(λ ) := φ(λ )p∗(1− p∗λ+ )= αλ+(1−α)(1−λ )4 .
Therefore the payoff is a linear function of λ .
Property 2 : If λ does not satisfy condition 1, then:
v(λ ) = v∗∗(λ ) := p∗∗(λ )(1− (1−φ(λ )λ− + φ(λ )λ+ )p∗∗(λ )) = 14 λ
+λ−
λ++φ(λ )(λ−−λ+) .
∂ 2v∗∗(p∗∗(λ ))
∂λ 2 > 0 if λ <
2
3 or λ ≥ 23 and α > 12 + 12
√
3λ−2
6−9λ+4λ 3 . Therefore the payoff is a convex
function of λ if λ < 23 or λ ≥ 23 and α > 12 + 12
√
3λ−2
6−9λ+4λ 3 and it is a concave function otherwise.
Property 3 : as ∂
3v∗∗(p∗∗(λ ))
∂λ 3 < 0 ∀λ , then whenever condition 1 holds strictly, v∗(λ ) > v∗∗(λ ), and
whenever condition 1 does not hold, then v∗(λ )< v∗∗(λ ).
Property 4 : There exists a λˆ that satisfies λˆ ∈ (0,1) and satisfies the following equation
λˆ 3 f3(α)+ λˆ 2 f2(α)+ λˆ 1 f1(α)+ f0(α) = 0,
105
where:
f3(α) := 1−6α+14α2−16α3+8α4
f2(α) :=−2+14α−38α2+48α3−24α4
f1(α) := 1−10α+31α2−42α3+21α4
f0(α) := 2α−8α2+12α3−6α4
and φ(λ )v∗∗2 (λ+)+(1−φ(λ ))v∗∗2 (λ−)> v∗∗2 (λ ) if λ < λˆ , and φ(λ¯ )v∗∗2 (λ¯+)+(1−φ(λ¯ ))v∗∗2 (λ¯−)<
v∗∗2 (λ¯ ) if λ > λˆ . Moreover λˆ ≥ (3α−2)/(2α−1).
Property 5 : if α > 2/3, there exists a ˆˆλ that satisfies ˆˆλ ∈ (0,1)
and satisfies the following equation
hatλˆ 5g5(α)+
ˆˆλ 4g4(α)+
ˆˆλ 3g3(α)+
ˆˆλ 2g2(α)+
ˆˆλ 1g1(α)+g0(α) = 0,
where: g5(α) := α−8α2+24α3−32α4+16α5
g4(α) := 1−13α+62α2−140α3+152α4−64α5
g3(α) :=−5+47α−179α2+346α3−344α4+152α5−16α6
g2(α) := 8−67α+234α2−432α3+437α4−224α5+44α6
g1(α) :=−5+40α−137α2+255α3−270α4+153α5−36α6
g0(α) := 1−8α+28α2−54α3+60α4−36α5+9α6
and φ(λ )v2(λ+)+ (1− φ(λ ))v2(λ−) > v2(λ ) if λ < ˆˆλ , and φ(λ¯ )v2(λ¯+)+ (1− φ(λ¯ ))v2(λ¯−) <
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v∗∗2 (λ¯ ) if λ >
ˆˆλ . Moreover ˆˆλ ≥ (3α−2)/(2α−1).
To prove part 1 of the Lemma, note that λ¯ > 0 only if α > 2/3. Moreover, λ1 < λ¯ implies λ+1 ≤ 3α−22α−1
and therefore λ−1 ,λ1 and λ
+
1 satisfy condition 1 in Lemma 27. Property 1 in turn implies that
whenever λ−1 ,λ1 and λ
+
1 satisfy condition 1 in Lemma 27 then Ev2(λ1) = v2(λ1) and the firm is
indifferent to whether social learning takes place.
To prove part 2 and 3 of the Lemma, we consider two cases separately. If α ≤ 2/3, then property 4
implies part 2 and part 3 (and ¯¯λ = λˆ ). If instead α > 2/3, then property 5 implies parts 2 and 3 of
the lemma 
Proof of Lemma 29. The price p∗∗1 (λ1) that satisfies p1 ∈ [0,λ−1 ] and maximizes the two period
payoff of the firm satisfies:
p∗∗1 (λ1) := argmax
λ−1 >p>0
p(1− (φ(λ1)
λ+1
+
1−φ(λ1)
λ−1
)p)+(
p
λ−1
− p
λ+1
)(Ev∗∗2 (λ1)− v∗∗2 (λ1)).
Which is equivalent to (3.2). Moreover, for any p′ ∈ [λ−,λ+] price:
p′′ := p
′(1−2α+α2−λ+3αλ−2α2λ )−αλ+α2λ
1−2α−λ+2αλ
satisfies ∀α ∈ [12 , 23 ] and ∀λ ∈ [0,1]:
1) p′′ ∈ [0,λ−]
2) p′′ ensures the same probability of social learning as p′: ( 1λ− − 1λ+ )p′′ = 1− p
′
λ+
3) p” ensures a strictly larger current payoff than p’: p′′(1− (φ(λ )λ+ + 1−φ(λ )λ− )p′′)> φ(λ )p′(1− p
′
λ+ )
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This is enough to show that p1(λ1) = min{λ−,max{p∗∗1 (λ1),0}} 
Proof of Lemma 30. If λ1 ≤ 1−4α4α2+1−4α then λ+1 ≤ 3α−22α−1 and therefore EV2(λ1) =V2(λ1). As a result,
as λ1 < (3α−2)/(2α−1) then p1(λ1) = p∗(λ1). We consider the case λ1 > 1−4α4α2+1−4α in the rest
of the proof.
The price p that satisfies p ∈ [λ−,λ+] and maximizes the two period payoff of the firm is:
p¯∗1(λ1) := argmax
λ−1 ≤p≤λ+1
φ(λ1)p(1− pλ+1
)+(
p
λ−1
− p
λ+1
)(EV2(λ1)−V2(λ1)).
Which is equivalent to
p∗1(λ1) =
1
2
[λ+1 +
δ
φ(λ1)
(V2(λ1)−EV2(λ1))] (3.9)
as long as 12 [λ
+
1 +
δ
φ(λ1)(V2−EV2(λ1))] ∈ [λ
−
1 ,λ
+
1 ].
The price p that satisfies p ∈ [0,λ−1 ] and maximizes the two period payoff of the firm satisfies:
p¯∗∗1 (λ1) := argmax
λ−1 ≤p≤0
p(1− (φ(λ1)
λ+1
+
1−φ(λ1)
λ−1
)p)+(
p
λ−1
− p
λ+1
)(EV2(λ1)−V2(λ1)).
Which is equivalent to (3.2).
To determine the optimal price we note that
I) If λ1 < 3α−22α−1 then:
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for any p˜ ∈ [0,λ−1 ] we can define
˜˜p := αλ1−α
2λ1+p˜(1−2α−λ1+2αλ1)
1−2α+α2−λ1+3αλ1−2α2λ1
˜˜p satisfies:
I.a) ˜˜p ∈ [λ−1 ,λ+1 ]
I.b) ˜˜p ensures the same probability of social learning as p˜: ( 1λ−1
− 1λ+1 )p˜ = 1−
˜˜p
λ+
I.c) ˜˜p ensures a strictly larger payoff in period 1 than p˜: p˜(1−(φ(λ1)λ+1 +
1−φ(λ1)
λ−1
)p˜)< φ(λ1) ˜˜p(1− ˜˜pλ+1 ).
II) If λ1 > 3α−22α−1 then:
for any ˜˜p ∈ [λ−,λ+] price:
p˜ :=
˜˜p(1−2α+α2−λ1+3αλ1−2α2λ1)−αλ1+α2λ1
1−2α−λ1+2αλ1
satisfies ∀α ∈ [12 , 23 ] and ∀λ ∈ [0,1]:
II.a) p˜ ∈ [0,λ−]
II.b) p˜ ensures the same probability of social learning as ˜˜p: ( 1λ−1
− 1λ+1 )p˜ = 1−
˜˜p
λ+
II.c) p˜ ensures a strictly larger current payoff than ˜˜p: p˜(1− (φ(λ1)λ+1 +
1−φ(λ1)
λ−1
)p˜)> φ(λ1) ˜˜p(1− ˜˜pλ+1 ).
(I) and (II) are enough to show that if λ1 < 3α−22α−1 then p1 satisfies p1 = min[max[λ
−, p¯1],1], while
if λ1 > 3α−22α−1 then p1 satisfies p1 = max[min[λ
−, p¯∗∗1 ],1], where p¯
∗∗
1 is defined in (3.2) 
Proof of Lemma 31. The product is purchased regardless of the private signal if p ≤ λ− and it is
purchased only if s = H in case p ∈ (λ−,λ+]. Therefore the optimal price satisfies p ∈ {λ−,λ+}.
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Profits from setting p = λ− are uF(λ−) = λ− while from setting p = λ+ are uF(λ+) = αλ+.
uF(λ+)> uF(λ−) iff condition 2 holds 
Proof of Lemma 32. The payoff from setting p1 = λ+1 is equivalent to u
F(λ+1 )+δφ(λ1)u
F(λ1|λ2 =
λ+1 )+(1−φ(λ1))uF(λ−−1 |λ2 = λ−1 ) (1)
The utility from setting p1 = λ+1 is equivalent to u
F(λ−1 )(1+δ ) (2).
(1) ≥ (2) iff δ ≥ δ¯ 
Proof of Lemma 33. If λ1 ≤ α+α2−12α2−α , then the firm sets p1(λ1) = λ+1 , as this price maximizes both
the current and the expected payoff. In this case the firm is indifferent to whether social learning
takes place, and therefore it sets the static optimal price, that is p1(λ1) = λ+1 . Otherwise the proof
is identical to the proof of Lemma 32, except that in this case (1) ≥ (2) iff δ ≥ ¯¯δ 
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